Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands by Colignatus, Thomas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Single vote multiple seats elections.
Didactics of district versus proportional
representation, using the examples of the
United Kingdom and The Netherlands
Thomas Colignatus
Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics
12. May 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22671/
MPRA Paper No. 22671, posted 14. May 2010 02:51 UTC
Single vote multiple seats elections
Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the 
examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands
Thomas Colignatus, May 12 2010
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool
JEL A20, D71, C88
ü Keywords
Political  economy, political  science,  public  choice,  optimal  representation,  electoral  systems,  elections,
voting, district,  proportional  representation,  electoral  quota,  majority,  pure  threshold,  qualified  majority,
greatest  remainder,  highest  average,  Webster,  Sainte-Laguë,  apportionment, wasted  vote,  multiple seats,
single seat,  empty seat,  free  seat,  additional-members system, mixed proportionality, political party, party
list, coalition
ü Abstract
No new issues are discussed but we try to improve on the didactics of some well-known elementary features
of multiple seats elections that rely on a single vote such as common elections for Parliament or the U.S.
Congress. The didactics concentrate on proportionality versus districts. Since some people in the UK want
more proportionality and some people in Holland want more districts, the examples of the UK 2010 and
Dutch  2006  general  elections  are  developed  in  some detail.  Subordinate  issues  are  (1)  majority versus
plurality, and (2) threshold methods versus the mechanisms of highest average, greatest remainder and the
principle of Sainte-Laguë & Webster. The latter can be optimal for apportionment of states or districts that
will get at least one seat. That kind of optimality can be dubious for political parties. Firstly because a party
with a majority in the turnout may miss out on majority in Parliament and secondly since voters for some
party A may not want that their vote, if wasted, goes to some party B. A proportional representation of the
wasted vote w in total n is also possible by leaving seats empty or by filling the seats and taking a qualified
majority f = 1/2 * n / (n - w). We thus should distinguish the mirroring of the proportions in the vote and the
mirroring of a majority (and it is not quite true that the first takes care of the latter). For a coalition formed
after the elections there is the more complex threshold of a “coalition qualified majority” since the coalition
may not always be a solid block. A compromise of proportionality and districts is to allow free (non-district)
seats for the overflow. E.g. if half of the seats in Parliament are for single seat districts then the district size
can be twice the electoral quota and a district candidate is (ideally) elected when gaining a majority of at
least one quota. An algorithm is given that includes such rules and some simulations are shown. A multiple
seats election is not quite the same as a series of single seat elections. Direct single seat elections such as for
the chief executive (President) are riddled with voting paradoxes. Superior to a single vote are some methods
with preference orderings like the Borda Fixed Point but these are somewhat complex. Optimal seems the
indirect  method where the electorate chooses Parliament in a single vote multiple seats  election and that
Parliament then applies the complexer preference  methods for the single seat election of the Premier.  For
example, though voters only gave a single vote, David Cameron would be the Borda Fixed Point winner,
second to Nick Clegg in a Borda count but still winning in a pairwise vote. It is also explained how to use
some new routines in Mathematica.
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1. Introduction
ü A didactic challenge
Rather than looking at mere numerical representation it can be more important to discuss information and
ways of discussion to enhance co-operation between people as a better road towards stable majorities and
governments. Nevertheless, the numbers belong to the rules of the game that drive the political process and it
remains  useful  to  understand  them.  There  are  curious  obstacles  towards  adoption of  superior  electoral
systems and we need to improve the didactics. H. Peyton Young (2004), for a symposium of the US Census
Bureau:
“The results of U.S. history, as well as theoretical considerations, show that Webster’s is the only one of
these methods that is unbiased in its treatment of small and large states. In fact, it can be shown that Web-
ster’s method is essentially the only rule that is unbiased and avoids these two [population and Alabama]
paradoxes.” (In considering the bias to small or large states, Young neglects the small states that get a seat
regardless of size.)
“The principles that have been forged in the crucible of political debate are simple to state and appeal to our
intuitions about fairness.  First and foremost is even-handedness or lack of bias: all states, large or small,
should get their fair share on average. Second, as the number of seats goes up (the pie grows) no one’s share
should go down. Third, as populations change, a growing state should not give up seats to a shrinking state.
The implications are surprisingly strong: there is essentially only one method - Webster’s - that satisfies all
three of these principles. It is commonly used in other representative democracies (where it goes under the
name Sainte-Lagüe’s [sic] method); in the United States it was the law of the land in the 1840s and again
during the period 1910-1940 when a combination of political interests  and scientific confusion led to its
abandonment. The ideal of one person, one vote would be well served if Congress reinstated this simple and
eminently sensible solution to the apportionment problem.”
Proportional representation is used in Holland while the US and UK use districts. A third position is Ger-
many where voters have two separate votes for district and nationally. Germany also has a high threshold of
5% and the story is that the FDP apparently has survived only because of this dual system, with some voters
e.g. voting locally for CDU and nationally for FDP. The dual approach creates a less transparent situation
and it might suffice to just lower the threshold. This present paper was triggered by the discussion both in
Holland (to increase the role of districts or to switch to the German model) and the UK (to switch to propor-
tionality). With those opposing currents in thinking, what are the didactics in this argument ? What are the
main issues and what should we focus on to arrive at conceptual clarity ? Might it be that those currents in
thinking actually converge to some compromise ? Convergence is less attainable when we live in a sea of
confusion.
Real situations and practical calculations are complicated and there are confusing historical aspects. As this
paper originated in the discussion in the Holland and the UK, their practical examples however helped in
writing this text and this should contribute to the didactics.  The discussion assumes that the reader  is not
familiar with the theory of multiple seats elections so that this document should be readable for a first year
student, yet it seems that we develop on the didactics of the topic of qualified majority that apparantly has
not been in focus of the advanced researchers in recent years.
ü The focus in this paper
The focus in this paper is on selecting and developing the main didactic points in multiple seats elections.
We consider the following situation: (1) Each voter in the electorate casts a single vote on a party, (2) Seats
in Parliament or Congress are assigned to the parties either (a) in proportion to the voters gained or (b) via
districts or (c) via districts subject to aggregate proportionality. Simple simulations will clarify the different
properties and the student should be able to conclude when what approach makes more sense.
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Districts  cater  to local identity and would enhance  the power base of a local candidate  versus the  party
leaders. This can be judged good or bad but can also be taken with some grain of salt. Parties in Holland
already tend to create their own regions and proclaim that the party MPs in those regions represent voters
there, if not all voters then at least their own. Holland is a small country, both in area and population (16
million), and the issue of districts might not compare to larger countries, though different Provinces have
unique histories. For large countries the issue of districts seems more relevant, such as the nations in the
European Union. Districts tend to be given and it is seldom the question to find the optimal district size
(gerrymandering excluded). The more basic question is the relation of districts to proportional representation.
Mueller (1989:217) quotes Breton & Galeotti 1985 on the distinction between representative and responsible
governments, where the first tends to emphasize proportionality and the second would be more neutral on
that issue (and thus easier  allows districts).  Those functions are  mixed since Parliaments commonly also
elect  the Executive,  and Mueller  suggests that the full  benefits  of either approach then are  not achieved
(p228). My impression is that this issue is too complex to make (such) strong statements. Apart from all
kinds of technical  measures that we may design for responsibility (managing a State over generations) it
remains a  political decision to regard  some particular  government as  (sufficiently)  responsible  and such
decision depends  upon the political environment that  is proportional or not.  It would seem that  there  is
conceptual independence for developing views on proportionality versus districts, as a subject of itself and to
be judged on itself.
ü Basic notions
It would be an option to have different weights per seat. For example, the Senator from California might get
a greater weight than the Senator from Oregon. Currently we stick to the notion that “one man, one vote”
also applies to representative bodies so that the electoral vote is rounded to integer values. Instead of the
common mathematical manner of rounding we will consider the electoral methods of the threshold, greatest
(highest) average, greatest remainder and the principle of Sainte-Laguë & Webster. Rounding is related to
the electoral quota, i.e. the average number of voters per seat. If a party gains 95% of that quota then this
result is not rounded to 1 but to 0. 
For proportional representation we can focus on the number of seats assigned to the parties and we may
disregard the selection of individual representatives. For example, parties could already have formulated a
list of candidates and they can be appointed either in that order or using the votes per candidate.
For district voting there is the simple case of plurality voting per single seat district with “winner takes all”.
This  is a simple way of rounding off that bypasses the Median Voter Theorem since the latter  concerns
majority and not plurality. For example if voters for candidates A, B and C are 45, 40 and 15 of a total of 100
then plurality assigns the seat to A, even though A lacks majority (at least 51). Voting in two rounds is not the
answer since it may well be that C is the better compromise candidate. The aggregate result in Parliament
might not be proportional, in particular when the number of seats is equal to the number of districts. Districts
can cause that a national minority still has a majority in Parliament, not only under plurality but also under
district majority. Note that there are more ways to implement a district. For example each party has only one
local candidate and then clearly one candidate must win unless there is a deadlock. Alternatively there can
be district lists, for example to allow for midterm replacement as in case of death, and the national party
leader might be on the list for popular recognition. 
For the third and compromise method we combine districts with aggregate proportionality. In a way Holland
already has this situation, but with 19 districts and 150 seats in Parliament the impact of districts is limited.
An alternative idea is to have 100 districts and 50 free seats, and we will give an algorithm how this could be
done. Each district would have size 1.5 of the quota and the majority threshould becomes 0.75 of the quota.
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There is some complexity: (a) the apportionment of seats to states or districts, (b) the assignment of seats to
parties, (c) the combination. The main difference is that a state would require at least one seat. For parties
the majority principle would be more important than for states, i.e. that when a party has a majority in the
electorate then this should also be reflected in the representative body. Apportioning seats to districts and
then having a popular vote to assign these per district to parties is the current practice in large nations or the
European Union, but introduces a complexity that is not essential for our present exposition. For simplicity in
this paper we use single seat districts but there can be free or non-district seats to generate proportionality.
This approach allows for districts of quite differing sizes of population (as is current practice) but also can be
used to understand the issue of equal representation per capita (by setting those districts to equal size or by
allowing free seats). 
ü Multiple seats versus single seat
The  selection of the Legislative (multiple seats)  and the Executive (single seat)  should not be confused.
Multiple seats elections differ from single seat elections that we discussed elsewhere, see VTFD, Colignatus
(2007).  For a single seat we allowed voters to express a preference ordering and not just a single vote. In
plurality voting that preference  order indeed is reduced to a single vote (the top preference  position if not
cheating). Since the preference  ordering provides more information it allows more complex methods. Can
we turn single seat elections into multiple seats elections ? Conceivably, a nation can be divided into dis-
tricts, each district could use the single seat method, and the representative body would consist of the district
winners.  This  is straightforward, though there  are nontrivial consequences.  If each district  would tend to
select a compromise candidate then the representative body would consist mainly of moderates. Instead, if
voters are  encouraged not to vote for a  compromise candidate  then the method of “one man, one vote”
projects  the  differing views in the  electorate  into a  mirror image in the  representative  body so that  the
compromise must be attained in that body rather than in the persons of the district winners themselves. 
Proportionality seems like a logical condition but it becomes paradoxical when it is combined with districts.
District methods can indeed be seen as series of single seat elections with no condition for the aggregate.
Proportional representation is separately required  to impose that condition on the aggregate. If aggregate
proportionality is imposed then the district vote can have the simple form of a single vote but adherents of
districts tend to use that form anyhow. Adherents of the district approach seem to accept the idea that its
representative must reflect the distict as much as possible but they somehow stop at requiring this for the
national aggregate. It might be that they confuse single seat and multiple seats elections, and possibly direct
and indirect voting. For the nation it seems unavoidable that the Prime Minister comes from one party so that
other parties (possibly 50%) might feel non-represented. A good PM puts in some effort to be above parties
and  indeed  represent  all.  The  same approach  might be  applied  to districts  (or  perhaps  historically con-
versely). But districts differ from a nation since the nation has the issue of aggregation over districts (that is
not necessarily solved by aggregation over district winners).
The  choice between plurality and majority is a bit curious as well. If plurality is adopted then the basic
consideration of “most votes” apparently is that the views within the electorate  must be mirrored in the
representative body. Why stop at “most votes” and not continue to at least 50% plus 1 ? The philosophy
behind plurality should rather  lead to proportionality. The reason that plurality is adopted is that majority
might be difficult to achieve so that no one gets elected. This consideration is merely practical and of itself
provides no reason to reject proportionality for the aggregate. If each district has one seat only and if minds
are closed to alternatives then this becomes an intellectual dead end street. Solutions however exist in more
seats per district and/or free or non-district seats.
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Majority rule should be properly interpreted too. First consider issues not related to persons, like building a
railroad. The idea of democracy is that a group first selects the Pareto optimal points and then, if there are
more of such points, decides by majority. Majority rule is a tie-breaking rule. Minorities can veto proposals
(a  train in their  backyard) that infringe upon their rights since such proposals are  not Pareto optimal. A
Senate is useful to supervise fair compensation and to check that minorities in Congress do not abuse their
veto rights. Secondly, for persons, seats become vacant and it is less of an option to maintain the status quo
of a vacant seat. If there is no 50% + 1 winner then other methods must be tried. This is also why multiple
seats elections are conceptually associated with proportional representation and why single seat elections are
conceptually associated with preference orderings.
For  logical reasons  it  seems optimal to  have proportional Parliament  and then  let  Parliament  select  the
Premier via more complex single seat methods (e.g. Borda Fixed Point). This also warrants that the Premier
has the same electoral base as Parliament. The US system of separate elections for both and having districts
for both (so that the US President, Congress and Senate frequently have different electoral supports) derives
from history and not from these considerations. These historical preconceptions will be an important element
in  the  didactics.  For  example,  since  US citizens  will  hesitate  about  changing their  Constitution from a
Presidential to a Parliamentary system, and will consider this politically infeasible (or since their President
will consider it dubious to appoint a Premier), they might simply not be interested and there may exist no
didactic method to clarify the issue. The US political process is less responsive to minority views other than
those  already  entrenched  and  this  clearly  perpetuates  itself.  Conceivably, though,  there  can  be  gradual
adaptation of local mechanisms, so that the issue may become better understood and appreciated.  Voting
remains a basic human activity that tends to draw some attention to itself.
ü Simplification except for a key issue
We will consider a simplified situation: (1) When a party has fewer candidates than gained seats, those seats
could not be assigned; but we assume that each party has at least as many candidates as there are seats. (2)
When more parties have the same number of voters (for a remaining seat) then there could be a random
selection; but now the allocation is to the first in the list of parties. (3) When there are more parties than seats
and when all get an equal share then no party passes the electoral quota and no seats can be allocated; but
this is neglected here. (4) The Netherlands allows parties to “combine” to cater for remaining seats; but this
is neglected here. (5) And so on. Once you start considering the details of selection then there are a multitude
of rules that we cannot even specify but which are dealt with or neglected by implication. 
There is one key point that commonly disappears from expositions. This concerns the blank votes, invalid
votes (sometimes including blanks) and votes for parties that do not pass the quota threshold. Rather than
neglecting these we note that they could be used to assign empty or void seats in parliament so that they raise
the threshold for a majority in Parliament. The discussed changes on proportionality and/or districts are also
supposed to do something about voter apathy and alienation. Focussing on the wasted vote would be a way to
account for when people vote with their feet. On close consideration it can be argued that proper proportional-
ity includes the wasted vote as part of the standard. This leads to the pure threshold and qualified majority
threshold ways of assignment.
With this simplification it appears possible to design some routines in Mathematica so that we can didacti-
cally highlight the elementary features of multiple seats elections. We will use the UK 2010 and Dutch 2006
general  elections as examples.  Some information on the routines is in the  text but also in Appendix A.
Appendix B is for variants for remainders. Appendix C has details on pure and qualified majority thresh-
olds. Appendix D extends the examples with districts. Appendix E discusses Simpson’s paradox. Appendix
F  includes  examples  of  single  seat  elections  also  using the  recent  UK outcome, so that  the  distinction
between single seat and multiple seats stands out more clearly.
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2. Example: UK Westminster elections in 2010
ü The 2010 results
In the 2010 UK Parliamentary elections 45.5 million registered voters chose 650 Members of Parliament.
The electoral quota is 1 / 650 = 0.15% of the electoral vote, though taken from the turnout of 65.1% (valid
votes). A total of 5.9% or 38 seats was wasted on parties that did not get seats. The UK uses a district system
so that the seats in Parliament need not be proportional to the votes. For example, the Conservatives have
36.1% of the turnout but get 47.1% of the seats. The following data were taken from the BBC on May 9
2010 when 649 seats were counted - in the constituency of Thirsk and Malton due to the death of a candidate
during the campaign the election has been delayed until 27 May. These data do not distinguish between valid
/ turnout and blanco / invalid. That website actually contains a good general introduction to the UK voting
issues and proposals.
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 44D;
TableForm@uk = MultipleSeatsCase@D, TableAlignments → RightD
UK 2010 H649 seats counted 2010-05-09L Voters Per 100000 Percentage Seats Label
Conservative 10 706 647 23 505 36.1 306 A
Labour 8 604 358 18 890 29 258 B
Liberal Democrat 6 827 938 14 990 23 57 C
Democratic Unionist Party 168 216 369 0.6 8 D
Scottish National Party 491 386 1079 1.7 6 E
Sinn Fein 171 942 377 0.6 5 F
Plaid Cymru 165 394 363 0.6 3 G
Social Democratic & Labour Party 110 970 244 0.4 3 H
Green 285 616 627 1. 1 I
Alliance Party 42 762 94 0.1 1 J
UK Independence Party 917 832 2015 3.1 0 K
British National Party 563 743 1238 1.9 0 L
Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force 102 361 225 0.3 0 M
English Democrats 64 826 142 0.2 0 N
Respect-Unity Coalition 33 251 73 0.1 0 O
Traditional Unionist Voice 26 300 58 0.1 0 P
Christian Party 18 623 41 0.1 0 Q
Independent Community and Health Concern 16 150 35 0.1 0 R
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition 12 275 27 0 0 S
Scottish Socialist Party 3157 7 0 0 T
Others 319 891 702 1.1 1 U
Yet unassigned 0 0 0 1 V
Turnout 29 653 638 65 100 100 650 a & t
PM. Total voted without seat 1 758 518 3861 5.9 38 Void
Electorate 45 551 000 100 000 - - l
A coalition of A and C has a clear majority while the combination of B and C with 315 falls short of 326. It is
a bit of magic in the UK rules that a minority in the electorate can take a majority in the turnout but still go
back to a minority in terms of seats. 
Coalition@Set, "B", "C"D
8List Ø 8B, C<, NVotersØ 15 432 296, ShareØ 0.520418, SeatsHNLØ 338.272, SeatsHParliamentLØ 315<
Coalition@"Magic", electorate = 45 551 000, 258 + 57D
Share Seats
Electorate 0.339 220.215
Valid vote 0.52 338.272
Parliament 0.485 315.
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We can compare the UK seats with those that would arise when the proportional rules of Dutch Parliament
were applied (where the Others and Yet Unassigned must be neglected).
8PartyLabels@D, s = Seats@D, d = DutchParliament@D, d − s<
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
306 258 57 8 6 5 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
238 191 152 3 10 3 3 2 6 0 20 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
-68 -67 95 -5 4 -2 0 -1 5 -1 20 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 -1
It is not necessarily true that proportional representation causes more need for coalitions since this depends
upon the political situation. If the UK political situation fluctuates around the above then the UK will also
have to get used to coalition governments. In this case proportionality would have the advantage that also B
and C could form a majority of 191 + 152 = 343. The idea that a party that loses an election should also
leave government derives from a bipolar win/lose world while under proportionality there are basically just
changes in the proportions. It is even recommendable that also the Executive mirrors the proportions, i.e. that
no major party is excluded from partaking in goverment. In the US and France members of opposition parties
have been appointed as ministers. 
The rules for Dutch Parliament may not be optimal. They already include most of the 38 seats of the smaller
parties but use the method of highest averages while Sainte-Larguë & Webster is more neutral to party size
and while a qualified majority threshold is stricter with respect to the wasted vote. Using the latter we get
65/128 = 50.78% or 331 seats instead of a plain majority of 326 seats.
QualifiedThreshold@D
:SeatsØ 8236, 190, 151, 4, 11, 4, 4, 2, 6, 0, 20, 12, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0<,
QualifiedMajorityØ : 65
128
, 0.507813, 331>>
The UK electoral quota of 45621 voters (turnout) per seat compares favourably to 65591 in Holland but the
65% turnout is unfavourable to the Dutch 80%.
ukeq = ElectoralQuota@D êê N
45 621.
The electoral quota plays no role in the system of districts but is crucial for proportional representation.
ü Proportionality and districts, using 2005 results
In the UK there are different proposals for the change to a more proportional system. Representation can be
measured both in terms of that electoral quota and in the majority rule in districts. Let us look at some UK
data on this. The district winners can be arranged by order of the number of votes that they received. Let us
relate this distribution to the electoral quota. 
The following frequency histogram can be constructed from Mellows-Facer (2006), taking the county results
for England in 2005 and calculating the average number of voters per seat per party. This gives 106 averages
for the 529 seats in total. The average is here 57.5 thousand, shown with the vertical line, with a median of
41.6 and a standard deviation of 44.2 thousand (and thus a coefficient of variation of 0.77). To get readable
chart  labels  we plot the data  per  10,000. Clearly these data  are inadequate  since votes per  party are  not
necessarily linked to seats per party. We should use the number of voters per individual member of Parlia-
ment, but these data are apparently dispersed over district internet pages. The UK statistical reports concen-
trate on the difference between the winner and the runner up, both absolutely and in percentages, which is
interesting for plurality but not relevant now for the degree of representation.
Figure: Frequency distribution of county winning averages, by size of the vote won (England 2005)
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If we want that each Member of Parliament has at least the electoral quota then 60 fail and 46 succeed. More
than half do not make it (if these were proper data). In these data 13 of the 106 winners get less than 50% of
the electoral quota. Note that the condition of one quota is strong. For single seat districts the district size
standardly is also the quota and then the candidate would have to have 100% of the vote. A majority winner
there would have 50% of the quota. If we require a candidate to have at least 100% of the quota and also
50% majority then this requires a district size of twice the quota. If we want 50% of the quota and the district
is 80% of the quota then the candidate must win 50/80 = 62.5% of the vote. The dispersion shown thus also
reflects the distribution of district sizes. Having district sizes of twice the quota requires that half of Parlia-
ment remains empty - but these seats could be filled with non-district seats to arrive at proportional representa-
tion. This  clarifies  in a  nutshell  what  the discussion between districts  and proportional representation  is
about, at least with respect to the arithmetic.
The above can be put into a stylized picture by approximating part of the distribution by a lognormal with the
same mean and spread (and implied q and t). Let us assume that this holds for all 650 seats in 2010. Then we
get the following graph for the density (graphically enlarged) and cumulative distribution, with the dashed
vertical line at the observed mean of 57.5 thousand, and the drawn vertical line at the electoral quota of 45.6
thousand (closer to the median at about 41.6 thousand for 325.5 seats). The graph clarifies that if we require
that a candidate wins at least the quota then Parliament would be half empty.
Figure: Stylized distribution of winners, by size of the vote won (UK 2010)
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Another statistic relates the number of votes for the winner to the share of that vote in the district. Unfortu-
nately we do not have those data either.  The following plot approximates this by relating the district size
(measured as the average number of voters (turnout) per county seat) to the share of the largest party in that
county. In smaller districts it may be easier to get a higher percentage of the vote and in larger districts it
would be easier to pass a quota threshold with a lower percentage. Most points are below 50%. The lines
show the vertical and horizontal conditions, only 1 point satisfies both.
10   2010-05-12-MultipleSeatsElections.nb
Figure: Size of the largest party, by size of the district (England 2005)
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These  graphs highlight the choice between proportionality and districts but also the scope for combining
them. For quota q and district size d  = r q, and threshold w > h q for the winner vote, then w / d  > h / r.The
majority condition is that w > d / 2, then w / d > Max[ h / r, 1/2] or w > Max[h, r / 2] q. This is neutral when
h  = r / 2. The arithmetic works against small districts r  < 2 h. The strong condition was to take h = 1 and r =
2 so that districts are twice the size of the quota. An UK change to proportional representation is accom-
plished by declaring those above h q as district winners and those below q as party list winners - though with
selection of the proper party list to keep account of proportionality.
With n the number of voters and s the number of seats then the electoral quota is q =  n / s. With m districts
of size d = r q that fill Parliament we find n = m d = m r q. For single seat districts m = s so that r = 1. In this
situation candidates only get the quota when they have 100% of the vote. Even with majority winners a large
percentage of the electorate is likely to be nonrepresented even though by official dogma they are called
represented.  With p  the fraction of Parliament filled by district seats so that 1 - p  is the fraction of non-
district seats then m = p s and n = m d = p s r q so that r = 1 / p. The district majority condition is least
affected when h  = r / 2 = 1 / (2 p). If p  = 1/2 then r = 2 and usefully h  = 1, which is the proper proportional
value. We can find some numerical examples and a graph. Districts and proportionality are often seen as the
opposing extremes but h  = 1 actually provides a compromise with free seats and there is a whole range
inbetween. A very practical value seems to be p  = 2/3 with district d = 1.5 q and h = 75%. 
p
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
r 2
3
2
5
4
1
h 1
3
4
5
8
1
2
Figure: District majority fraction as dependent upon the district share in Parliament
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We will return to districts below. Let us first consider the proportional example of Holland.
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3. Example: Dutch Parliamentary elections in 2006
ü The official results
In the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary elections 12.3 million registered voters chose 150 Members of Parliament.
The electoral quota is 1 / 150 = 0.67% of the electoral vote, though taken from the turnout of 80.2% (valid
votes). A total of 2 seats was wasted on invalid or blanco votes and parties that did not pass the threshold of
the electoral quota. The ruling coalition became CDA + PvdA + CU = 80 seats (labels A, B and H). If the
wasted vote had resulted in 2 void seats then that ruling coalition could have had 78 seats (see the calculation
in Appendix B), a bit less comfortable with respect to the required majority of 76 seats. Note that we cannot
simply say 80 - 2 Ø 78 since the assignment of remaining seats is no trivial matter. To reduce idiosyncracy
the scores can be expressed per 100,000 but we use the true scores since we also intend to show that the
routines can approximate the true national result.
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
lis = MultipleSeatsCase@D;
TableForm@lis, TableAlignments → RightD
Dutch Parliament 2006 Voters Per 100000 Percentage Seats Label
Christen Democratisch Appèl HCDAL 2608 573 21 269 26.51 41 A
Partij van de Arbeid HPvdAL 2085 077 17 001 21.19 33 B
VVD 1443 312 11 768 14.67 22 C
SP HSocialistische PartijL 1630 803 13 297 16.58 25 D
Fortuyn 20 956 171 0.21 0 E
Groenlinks 453 054 3694 4.6 7 F
Democraten 66 HD66L 193 232 1576 1.96 3 G
ChristenUnie 390 969 3188 3.97 6 H
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij HSGPL 153 266 1250 1.56 2 I
Nederland Transparant 2318 19 0.02 0 J
Partij voor de Dieren 179 988 1468 1.83 2 K
EénNL 62 829 512 0.64 0 L
Groep Wilders ê Partij voor de Vrijheid 579 490 4725 5.89 9 M
Lijst Poortman 2181 18 0.02 0 N
PVN - Partij voor Nederland 5010 41 0.05 0 O
Continue Directe Democratie Partij HCDDPL 559 5 0.01 0 P
Liberaal Democratische Partij 2276 19 0.02 0 Q
Verenigde Senioren Partij 12 522 102 0.13 0 R
Ad Bos Collectief 5149 42 0.05 0 S
Groen Vrij Internet Partij 2297 19 0.02 0 T
Lijst Potmis 4339 35 0.04 0 U
Tamara's Open Partij 114 1 0 0 V
SMP 184 2 0 0 W
LRVP - het Zeteltje 185 2 0 0 X
Valid votes 9 838 683 80 221 100. 150 a
PM. Below electoral quota 120 919 986 1.23 1 b
PM. Wasted Hinvalid or below quotaL 137 234 1119 1.39 2 Void
Invalid votes Hincl. blancoL 16 315 133 - 0 g
Turnout 9 854 998 80 354 - - t
Electorate 12 264 503 100 000 - - l
The coalition formed after the elections has 41.5% in the (registered) electorate, 51.7% in the turnout and 80
seats or 53.3% in Parliament. By magic, a minority in the electorate becomes a more or less comfortable
majority in Parliament.
Coalition@Set, "A", "B", "H"D
8List Ø 8A, B, H<, NVotersØ 5084 619, ShareØ 0.516799, SeatsHNLØ 77.5198, SeatsHParliamentLØ 80<
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Coalition@"Magic", electorate = 12 264 503, 80D
Share Seats
Electorate 0.415 62.187
Valid vote 0.517 77.52
Parliament 0.533 80.
If the non-voters would be represented by empty seats then there would be a 25% higher electoral quota for a
seat  and a higher threshold for forming a coalition. Given that the majority principle  is essentially a tie-
breaking rule for  Pareto points, it  might perhaps  be  accepted  that  the non-voters are  not represented  by
empty seats. Since there is a tendency to also decide on non-Pareto points the question matter however is of
critical importance. For some issues there are already some rules for a qualified majority (e.g. 2/3).
ü The simulation of Dutch Parliament
The routine DutchParliament[ ] generates the same result as the official assignment. It is not guaranteed that
this will also be the case - or rather it is guaranteed that it will not always be so. The routine only includes
the basic features and neglects some particulars and thus only approximates Dutch Parliamentary elections.
The routine helps to understand the issues and general mechanism and allows us to indicate consequences of
alternatives. 
Seats@D = official = Transpose@Rest@Drop@lis, −6DDD@@5DD
841, 33, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 2, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dp = DutchParliament@D
841, 33, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 2, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
The difference with the official results is:
dif = official − dp
80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
As said, the Dutch system need not be optimal. The electoral quota (higher than in the UK) causes that there
are  more remaining seats  and  these  cause  a  higher  qualified  majority threshold,  which  however is  not
recognized in the official rules. Using Sainte-Laguë & Webster instead of highest averages: 
QualifiedThreshold@D
:SeatsØ 841, 32, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 3, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<,
QualifiedMajorityØ :25
47
, 0.531915, 80>>
Seats@D − HSeats ê. %L
80, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
? DutchParliament
DutchParliament@v, nD first sets Voters = v and NumberOfSeats = n, and then calls DutchParliament@D
DutchParliament@nD first sets NumberOfSeats = n, and then calls DutchParliament@D
DutchParliament@D uses the defaults already set
The routine first allots for ProperMajority and who gets at least one quota, then takes the Floor
on the NaiveAssignment Hfor the remainderL and then applies HighestAverage Hgreatest
averageL on the remaining voters and seats. Option RemainingSeats might also be set to
GreatestRemainder Hfor Dutch Councils with less than 19 seatsL or SainteLagueWebster
Hfor intellectual curiosityL. Such application is to remaining seats and not from zero onwards
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Global variables
For the simulations below it helps to explain some technical points. The routines use some global variables
that make interactive use easier. The default values have been taken from these Dutch elections. The term
“vote” can be ambiguous since citizens can vote for parties and parties can vote in Parliament; it is useful to
say “(number of) voters” and “(number of) seats”. We use NVoters[ ] as a function (sum of Voters) and
NumberOfSeats as a parameter.
? NumberOfSeats
Number of seats to be allocated. Must be set for routines to work. Default value 150 HDutch ParliamentL
? Seats
Seats@D can be set to the list of seats, with length NumberOfParties, and sum NumberOfSeats
? Voters
List of voters allocated across the parties. Must be set for routines to work.
Default value given by the Dutch Parliamentary elections in 2006, www.kiesraad.nl
From these two data we can find the number of voters required to gain a seat.
? ElectoralQuota
ElectoralQuota@D := NVoters@D ê NumberOfSeats, i.e. the number of voters required to gain a seat
ElectoralQuota@LessD gives a list of 1 or 0 whether the party in Voters has less than the quota
ElectoralQuota@GreaterEqualD gives a list of 1 or 0 whether the party in Voters has at least the quota
ElectoralQuota@Less, MessageD gives a message how many parties are below the quota
ElectoralQuota@Less, Test H, MessageLD returns True when there are such parties otherwise False
ElectoralQuota@Assignment, aD gives a message Hand FalseL when a is to a party below the quota
ElectoralQuota@D êê N
65 591.2
ü The wasted vote
? WastedVote
WastedVote is an option to routines like QualifiedThreshold
WastedVote@D can be set by the user to a value standing for the blank voters
or HotherwiseL invalid votes Hand perhaps the non-votersL. Typically WastedVote@ND
for the number of voters and WastedVote@SeatsD for the potential impact
WastedVote@0D is used in VoidSeats@EquationsD
The notion of “wasted vote” derives from the context of proportionality. In a simple district method, a lot of
views will not be represented but this is considered part of the system. 
It is a design question to work with the long lists of original data or to clean them up and use the three
sources of waste in a separate account. In some respects this can be immaterial since there can be cases with
long lists anyway. We will use the two formats. The  main point is to be aware  of the denominator that
determines the electoral quota.
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The first source of waste are the blanco and invalid votes. More conventionally they are not included but it is
fair to include them, so that they would affect the quota. In the Dutch data the number is small but it makes a
difference of going from 1 to 2 wasted seats. It was a surprise to see that they cause that the ruling coalition
does not satisfy the qualified majority threshold.
WastedVote@ND = 16 315;
A second source of waste is from parties below the threshold from the electoral quota. They will not get seats
but in principle they should be in the calculation since they contribute to the electoral quota.
A third source is the remainder = v - q fna, with v = Voters, q = the electoral quota, and fna = Floor[v / q] the
floor of the naively assigned seats (i.e. v / q rounded down to an integer value). In Holland these are 8 seats
and in current practice  those voters are assigned to other parties than they voted for. The “Partij voor de
Dieren” (“Party for the Animals”) gets 2 seats and just misses out on a 3rd seat, and those voters disappear in
the  process.  Remaining seats  in Holland are  assigned using the method of highest average  (that  favours
bigger parties) instead of the method of greatest remainder or the principle of Sainte-Laguë & Webster. As a
result we get the surplus = v - q s, with s the officially assigned seats, and that surplus is negative for parties
that  gain  and  positive for  parties  that  contribute.  Is  this  mere  mathematical  approximation or  are  there
political principles involved ?
surplus = Voters − Floor@Seats@D ElectoralQuota@DD
8-80 667, -79 433, 306, -8977, 20 956, -6084, -3541, -2578, 22 084, 2318, 48 806,
62 829, -10 830, 2181, 5010, 559, 2276, 12 522, 5149, 2297, 4339, 114, 184, 185<
surplus ∗ Coalition@D
8-80 667, -79 433, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -2578, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
The three sources of waste can be treated as one wishes. The three main methods are as follows (with the
numbers of seats involved). The treatment by Dutch Parliament has been mentioned. The pure threshold
assigns all non-quota votes to empty seats, thus 10 in total. The qualified majority threshold method uses this
void to determine the qualified majority decision making threshold f > 1/2 and then distributes those 10 seats
using Sainte-Laguë & Webster. We thus should distinguish the mirroring of a majority and the mirroring of
the proportions in the vote (and it is not quite true that the latter takes care of the first).
Method Invalid v < q Remainder
Seats 0.2 1.9 8
DutchParliament No Remove Highest averages
PureThreshold Yes To void To void
QualifiedThreshold Yes For qual.maj. H1L For qual.maj. H2L SL. &
With these the essentials, let us look into the building blocks of proportionality.
4. Naive assignment, proper majority and the remainder
ü Introduction
This section discusses the underlying principles of proportional representation. The wasted vote is discussed
in next section.
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ü Principles
Naive assignment allocates the seats in proportion to the votes without rounding off. A first correction is to
round down to the lowest integer value, so that the fractional part is dropped. Because of the rounding error a
party that would have a majority of say 50.1% in the electoral vote might actually not get its proper majority
in Parliament.  This  can be  corrected  for.  The  remaining seats  can be  assigned using the  method of the
highest  average  (that  favours  bigger  parties).  These  steps  are  in  the  rules  for  the  Dutch  Parliamentary
election.
This discussion clarifies that issues can get complicated. For example, in a Parliament with 75 seats (thus
uneven) and two parties with each 50% of the electoral vote, it might make more sense to leave one seat
empty and assign each 37 seats, rather than assign the majority randomly. It might perhaps also make sense
to call a re-election. Practical methods are much influenced by history. Having an even number of seats in
Parliament helps to split a 50-50 vote while a majority score can be assigned the proper majority.
? NaiveAssignment
NaiveAssignment@v, nsD is the vote share in v times the number of seats, still a fractional number
NaiveAssignment@D := NaiveAssignment@Voters, NumberOfSeatsD Husing defaultsL
? ProperMajority
ProperMajority@shareD tests whether the share of voters gives a majority Hnot
just plurality but more than 50%L and generates the appropriate number of seats
ProperMajority@Test, a H, vLD Hdefault v = VotersL tests whether a possible majority in v is properly
copied into a majority in a, and if so sets ProperMajority@TestD to True otherwise False. Output
are information tables. Note that there can be true ê false positives ê negatives. An output
Majority -> 8False, True< means that a party has no majority in the voters but does in seats
WhichBx  1
2
,
NumberOfSeats
2
, x >
1
2
, max
NumberOfSeats
2
+ 1, NumberOfSeats x , True, 0F
? HighestAverage
HighestAverage@a, vD for voters v and an assignment a of seats: assigns
an additional seat to the group with the highest HgreatestL average in v ê Ha + 1L
HighestAverage@a, v, mD continues this process for additional m seats, step
by step. For DutchParliament@D m is the remainder after Assignment@D
HighestAverage@a, mD is the same as HighestAverage@Voters, a, mD
HighestAverage@aD for Voters and an assignment a of seats
If a = 8< then a zero assignment is used
If m is negative then -m is assumed to be
the total number of seats and the addition must be -m - Plus üü a
ü A simple example
ü Basics
This gives an example of 150 seats where a party with an electoral majority might miss out when the method
of highest average is used. Correction for the majority is required.
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MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 1D
8150, 88001, 590 000, 602 000<<
The share in the vote shows that all parties pass the electoral quota and that the last party has a 50.16%
majority
RVoters@D êê N
80.00666749, 0.491666, 0.501666<
NaiveAssignment@D êê N
81.00012, 73.7499, 75.2499<
% êê Floor
81, 73, 75<
Without correction the majority party will miss out on its majority.
HighestAverage@%, 1 D
81, 74, 75<
Given the majority in the electoral vote we can first assign those seats and then distribute the remainder.
ProperMajority ê@ RVoters@D
80, 0, 76<
ü Imposing majority in seats if it occurs with voters
The following routines impose the majority principle.  Note that this does not apply to coalitions that are
formed after the election. The Dutch system allows such grouping of parties before the elections (which we
however neglect here). PM. This call of HighestAverages does not test on the total already assigned.
Assignment@D
81, 73, 76<
HighestAverage@%D
80, 1, 0<
? Assignment
Assignment@v, nD sets Voters = v and NumberOfSeats = n, then calls Assignment@D
Assignment@D checks on ProperMajority and
ElectoralQuota@GreaterEqualD and assigns Floor@v ê qD with q = ElectoralQuota@D
PM. For testing purposes:
Assignment@1, 2D := Assignment@1D + Assignment@2D
Assignment@1D := ProperMajority êü RVoters@D
Assignment@2D := Floor@NaiveAssignment@RemainingVoters@1D, RemainingSeats@1DDD Hdifferent q!L
Both use global parameters Voters and NumberOfSeats
? RemainingSeats
RemainingSeats@1D := NumberOfSeats - Plus üü Assignment@1D. See Assignment
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? RemainingVoters
RemainingVoters@1D := HIf@Ò === 0, 1, 0D& êü Assignment@1DL Voters. See Assignment
RemainingVoters@seatsD := Voters - Floor@seats ElectoralQuota@DD
RemainingVoters@D := RemainingVoters@Seats@DD
ü PM. Testing on majority
Testing whether an electoral majority is properly copied to seats is a bit cumbersome. There are errors of
Type I and Type II. We actually would not want that a minority party still gets a majority in seats. The
routine DutchParliament[ ] does not use the latter check.
ProperMajority@Test, 81, 76, 73<D
:MajorityØ 8True, True<, MessageØMajority position NOT copied from voters to assignment,
$ majority in Voters Ÿ$ majority in Voters
$ majority in seats Wrong position 0
Ÿ$ majority in seats 0 0
,
Max Sumê2 MajorityQ Position Max
Voters 602 000
1200001
2
True 3
Seats 76 75 True 2
>
ü The DutchParliament routine
The final routine DutchParliament[ ] combines these two subroutines so that the majority party indeed gets
its majority. Perhaps  it might be forced in the Assignment[ ]  routine that the electoral quota rule is also
satisfied but for now we rely on the routine for the remainder (highest average). Alternatively we preselect
the parties that got at least one seat via BelowQuotaToVoid[ ] (see below).
DutchParliament@D
81, 73, 76<
ü Two common alternatives (that is, for Holland)
The following two common alternative methods do not check on proper majority and the quota threshold.
GreatestRemainder@8<, 150D
81, 74, 75<
SainteLagueWebster@8<, 150D
81, 74, 75<
It is also possible to calculate  these outcomes from a minimization of some error, see Kestelman (2005).
Either with the NMinimize (local) or Minimize (global optimum) or via a grid of integer values. This may be
awkward to use for many parties.
Apportionment@150, Voters, 1, Range → 6, Take → GridD
81, 74, 75<
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Appendix B contains variants for the 2006 Dutch case  on these remainder rules. When we combine the
variants of greatest remainder or Sainte-Laguë & Webster, a total of 100 seats, and 2 void seats, then 3 seats
are reassigned but the ruling coalition still maintains 51 seats in the Parliament of 100 seats. In principle a
51.7% coalition majority in the turnout might be lost since, as said, the rules for Dutch Parliament check on a
majority of a single party (or combination) before the election but they do not check for a majority of a
coalition formed after the election.
Appendix D, subsection 4, has an example where the methods of highest average and greatest remainder
have different results. The method of the greatest remainder is used in Holland for city Councils with less
than 19 seats.
ü Paradoxes
There are voting paradoxes again. In particular the method of the greatest remainder is vulnerable to them.
The methods that use a ratio like the highest averages or Sainte-Laguë & Webster are less vulnerable. Recall
the Young quote on the optimality of the principle by Sainte-Laguë & Webster.
(1) A party with a small percentage increase in electoral support may still lose a seat, depending upon the
distribution of the other votes. This example is taken from Malkevitch (2002ab) - who discusses a different
application, apportionment of seats of US States in US Congress, see also the discussion on the square root
rule for the EU.
PartyLabels@3D
8A, B, C<
Voters = 8657 000, 237 000, 106 000<;
DutchParliament@100, RemainingSeats → GreatestRemainderD
866, 24, 10<
Suppose that the electoral support for party A rises and that it drops for C. In this case A will actually lose a
seat and C can gain a seat.
Voters = 8660 000, 245 100, 104 900<;
DutchParliament@100, RemainingSeats → GreatestRemainderD
865, 24, 11<
(2) The Alabama paradox is that the number of seats is increased while a party actually loses a seat. In above
case, if the number of seats is increased from 100 to 101 then two parties win and C loses its seat again.
DutchParliament@101, RemainingSeats → GreatestRemainderD
866, 25, 10<
(3) Simpson’s paradox relates to proportions, see Appendix E. It can occur in voting situations but appar-
ently it has no impact on the issue of getting elected (unless procedures are based upon such proportions).
ü Fairness and optimality
Michel  Balinski and H. Peyton Young proved an impossibility theorem, showing that there  would be no
apportionment  procedure  that  satisfied  certain  conditions.  Dropping conditions  would come  along with
paradoxes. Apportionment for states however comes with the requirement that each state receives at least
one representative, which need not be the case for parties - unless we consider only those parties that got the
electoral quota. For parties we would like to see that a majority in the electorate or turnout also means a
majority in Parliament - which might be different for states.
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We refer to the H.P. Young quote in the introduction (Mueller: papers on PR start with quotes). The popula-
tion and Alabama paradoxes are relatively minor compared to the paradoxes that arise from districting, see
below. In all cases the method of Sainte-Laguë & Webster conforms to proportionality, yet it may need to be
amended by the majority principle, while an important aspect of (non-numerical) optimality is also the issue
of the wasted vote.
5. The wasted vote
ü The Pure Threshold method and the data
Above we mentioned the pure threshold and the qualified majority threshold method. Before discussing them
in detail it is useful to consider the data again. Let us first include the invalid votes and secondly clean up for
the wasted parties below the threshold. The naive assignment means 2 seats for that total. Thirdly we can
collect all remainders and find another 8 seats. Thus in total there are 10 empty seats. Simply leaving those
empty can be called the pure threshold method.
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
pth = PureThreshold@WastedVote → WastedVote@NDD;
Table: Comparison of official Dutch Parliament with the pure threshold assignment.
RemainderTable@Seats@D, pthD
Voters Seats@1D Remainder@1D SeatFraction@1D Diff . Seats@2D Remainder@2D SeatFraction@2D
A 2608 573 41 -85 126 -1.296 -2 39 46 274 0.704
B 2085 077 33 -83 022 -1.264 -2 31 48 378 0.736
C 1443 312 22 -2087 -0.032 -1 21 63 613 0.968
D 1630 803 25 -11 696 -0.178 -1 24 54 004 0.822
F 453 054 7 -6845 -0.104 -1 6 58 855 0.896
G 193 232 3 -3867 -0.059 -1 2 61 833 0.941
H 390 969 6 -3230 -0.049 -1 5 62 470 0.951
I 153 266 2 21 867 0.333 0 2 21 867 0.333
K 179 988 2 48 589 0.74 0 2 48 589 0.74
M 579 490 9 -11 809 -0.18 -1 8 53 891 0.82
Void 137 234 0 137 234 2.089 10 10 -519 765 -7.911
Total 9 854 998 150 8 0 0 150 9 0
With the inclusion of 137,234 voters, the electoral support for the coalition of A, B and H drops to 51.6% and
its seats to 39 + 31 + 5 = 75. The three parties have an electoral support of 77.4 seats but, being three, they
split it up into remainders of 2.4 seats that are assigned to the empty seats. In the current rules they gain 5
seats and thus appropriate voters 2.6 = 5 - 2.4 seats from other parties to arrive at a total of 80. Should they
be allowed to do so ?
Seats@D = pth; Coalition@Set, ListD
8List Ø 8A, B, H<, NVotersØ 5084 619, ShareØ 0.515943, SeatsHNLØ 77.3915, SeatsHParliamentLØ 75<
 One  can  imagine an  argument in  favour of the  current  rules that,  admittedly, the  rules might treat  the
remainders perhaps in a wrong manner but they at least generate an approximately proper end result for a
coalition. Historically Holland had both  some large parties  that were  favoured by this method and easy
entrance of competitors. However, this is a dubious argument since all kinds of coalitions can be imagined so
that the empty seats could be allocated to any party on the ground that they might join some coalition. If this
is the intention then it would make more sense to allow ex post grouping, so that the assignment of seats
would not remain a single decision taken just after the elections but might change midterm with a change of
coalition.
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Stil, given the majority principle, and assuming that a vote for a party implies a mandate to form coalitions,
we note that within the voters the coalition has a majority of 77 seats rounded down. Admittedly, it would be
a system to maintain a simple majority threshold of 76 seats,  assign 2 additional seats  to the 3 coalition
parties that now have 75, and keep 8 empty seats (for the non-coalition). The coalition would include the
assignment of the two seats in the coalition agreement and for them it would be attractive to let the non-
coalition parties  try an  opposition with 8  empty seats.  Problems are:  (1)  The  allocation of 2  seats  to  3
coalition parties (if our advice is asked). (2) After the 2 seats are assigned then a party with that assigned
seat might leave the coalition and join another one. (3) Not all matters are settled in a coalition agreement, or
rather most of them are not, so that cross-boundary decisions may well be the common state of affairs. The
notion of qualified majority helps out.
A drawback of empty seats is that people in a meeting may forget about them and simply fall back to the
majority in the room. You don’t tend to miss people who are never there. A tradition to always check on a
qualified majority threshold would then be better.  PM. The  option of empty seats  is implied by Mueller
(1989:219) but there not elaborated on.
ü Principles of the Qualified (Majority) Threshold method
Proportional representation is a container concept for various approaches.  Our study of the Dutch system
showed some troubling properties. Young (2004) in our quote above is right that the Sainte-Laguë & Web-
ster approach would be optimal for apportionment of states but for political parties we would also require: 
(1) A check on the majority principle.
(2) Inclusion of the blanco / invalid vote. Hence void seats or a qualified majority (that affects (1)).
(3) No assignment of voters to parties they did not vote for. Hence the remainder must give void seats or a
qualified majority (that affects (1)).
(4) The method of Sainte-Laguë & Webster then is highly relevant for the adjusted data. The starting point is
not zero but uses the assignment from (1) to (3).  The empty seats can be used to better approximate the
proportions in the non-empty seats.
This  can  be  called  the  “qualified  (majority)  threshold”  method. We thus  distinguish representation  and
majority from the  mere  numerical  exercise  of approximating a  distribution. NB. The  non-voters are  not
included  yet.  Numerically they can  easily be  included  in  the  routines  but  conceptually that  application
requires more research. Including them and raising the qualified majority might give too much of a bonus to
absenteism and we should rather  stimulate voters to participate  and express their  opinion, even if  it is a
blanco vote.
The major unresolved issue with respect to these principles is that a coalition formed after the elections may
get a majority in the electorate but not within Parliament with this qualified majority threshold. A coalition-
dependent  correction  would involve a  reassignment  of  seats  at  the  cost  of  the  non-coalition. The  pure
threshold method remains conceptually superior unless we formulate an additional criterion for coalitions.
PM. A conceivable approach is to also require that the capacity to form coalities is copied from the electoral
outcome to Parliament (Penrose-Banzhaf index).
ü Application
We would like to see that an assignment routine puts out a simple list but qualified majority is too important
to hide in a background parameter. The output gives qualified majority as the integer fraction, the real and
the number of seats. Including the blanco and invalid votes now raises the threshold from 80 to 81 seats.
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MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
qth = QualifiedThreshold@WastedVote → WastedVote@ND, Hold → FalseD
:SeatsØ 841, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 3, 9<, QualifiedMajorityØ :15
28
, 0.535714, 81>>
Table: Comparison of official Dutch Parliament with the qualified threshold assignment.
RemainderTable@Seats@D, Seats ê. qthD
Voters Seats@1D Remainder@1D SeatFraction@1D Diff . Seats@2D Remainder@2D SeatFraction@2D
A 2608 573 41 -47 615 -0.735 0 41 -47 615 -0.735
B 2085 077 33 -52 831 -0.815 -1 32 11 955 0.185
C 1443 312 22 18 040 0.278 0 22 18 040 0.278
D 1630 803 25 11 176 0.173 0 25 11 176 0.173
F 453 054 7 -441 -0.007 0 7 -441 -0.007
G 193 232 3 -1123 -0.017 0 3 -1123 -0.017
H 390 969 6 2259 0.035 0 6 2259 0.035
I 153 266 2 23 696 0.366 0 2 23 696 0.366
K 179 988 2 50 418 0.778 1 3 -14 367 -0.222
M 579 490 9 -3575 -0.055 0 9 -3575 -0.055
Total 9 717 764 150 4 0.001 0 150 5 0.001
The 137,234 voters are excluded from the lists since they get zero seats in both of them. The coalition parties
seem to have a higher share in the turnout but the qualified majority rule corrects for that. Since the highest
averages are replaced by Sainte-Laguë & Webster, the coalition gets 41 + 32 + 6 = 79 seats and 2 short of
the qualified majority of 81. 
Seats@D = Seats ê. qth; Coalition@Set, ListD
8List Ø 8A, B, H<, NVotersØ 5084 619, ShareØ 0.523229, SeatsHNLØ 78.4844, SeatsHParliamentLØ 79<
PM 1. With the Hold Ø True option (default) the original list of 24 parties can be maintained and the lists of
Voters is not affected. With the application of Hold Ø False the list of parties is reduced to those that pass
the quota threshold. Repeated application then causes repeated inclusion of the wastes vote and results in
different outcomes. PM 2. The routine has stored the results in this place.
Options@QualifiedMajorityD
:Fraction Ø 15
28
, RealØ 0.535714, IntegerØ 81, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 10>
ü Savouring the principles and dealing with coalitions
The issue of the wasted vote is no trivial matter.  In the conventional methods the voters for party A  are
assigned to some other party B while they really did not vote for it. The axiom is that there can be no void
seats. Let us reconsider the issue.
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(1) Policy issues frequently have a yes / no character.  Are you for or against capital punishment ? Do you
agree to raise taxes next year or not ?  When questions are formulated in the form agree / do not agree, there
seems no room for indifference or “I don’t know”. Hence, the argument goes, there would be no room either
for people who cannot make up their mind or who cannot find a party with some impact. However, this is not
quite true. There are all kinds of shades. You might accept capital punishment but at such conditions that it is
hardly ever executed. Or you may be against capital punishment but hesitant about higher taxes to pay for
adequate prisons so that you allow for conditions there such that life for some will be short. It is not true that
if you do not know your preference on some issue that you must leave the answer to a simple majority of
those who claim they do. The status quo can persist. In addition, the very idea of democracy is that people
may express their opinion. If their party does not get a lot of support then it is okay to say that they are
advised to reconsider their allegiance but is quite another matter to neglect that vote and basically assign
their  vote  to  a  different  party.  The  aggregation of  preferences  should  not  be  confused  with  numerical
approximation.
(2) With n voters and s seats the electoral quota is q = n / s. Let the w wasted voters (including the remain-
ders) be translated into empty seats e = w / q but rounded to an integer value. What is optimal, how do we
apply the routines ? (A principled discussion is put here in terms on how to use the routines but this has the
advantage of clarity.)
(2a) Simplest is to have a party "Void". The structure of the problem is not affected and our algorithms still
work. This implies however that all our calculations involve this group with possibly an overload of useless
calculation and reporting. Above routines such as for the highest average generate long lists of seats with a
lot of zero values for the wasted parties. Including the "Void" group actually cleans that up and this might be
a  good (intermediate)  step.  The  empty seats  in  Parliament  force  other  parties  to  co-operate  in  larger
coalitions.
(2b) For practical purposes the number of seats s might be adjusted to s' = s - e. For example, with a Parlia-
ment of 150 seats  and 10 empty ones we might use the routines with a Parliament of 140 seats. In that
manner we eliminate the "Void" group from our reports. Due to rounding the electoral quota q' = (n - w) / (s
- e) may however be affected. Also, if there are 10 empty seats then it is not proper to take the majority as 70
+ 1 seats in a Parliament of 140. There would still be a majority threshold of m = 76 that now could be called
qualified majority. In this respect  we already meet the notion that f = 75 / 140 = 1/2 s / s' is a qualified
majority fraction that is larger that 1/2.  It will be useful to use the “more than” (>) relation for the factor f
but round the seats up and then use the “at least” (¥) notion for seats m. 
(2c) We may also let all seats be filled but then adapt the majority threshold into qualified majority (the
mirror of (2b)). If s' = s - e is projected into s again by the factor s / s' then the majority factor is 1 / 2 (before
projection) times that same factor s / s' so that qualified majority factor f = 1/2 s / s'. This gives m = f s = s2 /
(s - e) / 2 in terms of seats, properly m = Ceiling[f s]. For example, if the Parliament has s = 150 seats of
which there are e = 10 empty, then the majority threshold of 76 seats becomes qualified majority 150 / (150 -
10) * 150 / 2 or 81 seats, rounding up, meaning that a coalition must have at least 81 seats.
Due to the rounding problem the threshold can actually beter be determined from the electoral scores. Then f
= 1/2 n / (n - w) and m = f s rounded up. If a party has more than 50% of electoral support then we must
make sure that it has more than f s seats. The following example plot uses seats however.
QualifiedMajority@150, 10D
81
Figure: Qualified majority threshold as a function of the wasted vote (150 seats in Parliament)
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Plot@Ceiling@150^2 ê H150 − eL ê 2D, 8e, 0, 25<,
AxesLabel → 8"Empty\nseats", "Qualified majority HSeatsL"<D
5 10 15 20 25
Empty
seats
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
Qualified majority HSeatsL
For the Dutch case, if we use the electoral outcome, then the threshold remains 81 seats (we did not round
q). PM. This calculation requires input from the pure threshold.
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
pth = PureThreshold@WastedVote → WastedVote@NDD;
QualifiedMajority@NVoters, pthD
:Fraction Ø 4927 499
9197 990
, RealØ 0.535715, IntegerØ 81, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 10>
(2d) After the election, parties form a majority coalition. For a single party it is reasonable to test whether it
passes the proper majority in the voters, and assign it  the qualified majority if needed.  It could be a bit
unreasonable to do so for a coalition afterwards since the election was on parties and not on the coalition.
Nevertheless, voters for a party also give a mandate to form a coalition. Approach (2a) is simplest, since part
of the coalition agreement would be that empty seats within the coalition are assigned to some party. How-
ever, this might lead to needless discussion and there arises the question whether a party can keep such seats
if  joining another coalition. The  better rule is that an electoral majority coalition rather  has the qualified
majority in  terms of  seats;  and if  the  seats  have  already been  filled  then the  qualified  majority can  be
adapted. The value can be found by not taking seats but voters. Then f ' = 1/2 n / (n - w') where w' = w - c,
and c the wasted voters for the coalition parties (also the disappointed voters who did not want that coalition).
The logic of the matter gives rise to the notion of double qualification, i.e. a “coalition qualified majority”:
(a) When members in the majority coalition all vote the same then the qualified majority f ' and m' = f ' s
holds that was calculated  using their electoral  support, effectively q  = Max[m',  k], for k  the seats  of the
coalition, (b) When members in the majority coalition do not all vote the same then the qualified majority f
holds that was calculated using the electoral wasted vote in all parties. 
Clearly, when a coalition is far below the normal threshold so that Max[m', k] << m then this rule gives a lot
of weight to a single dissenting member of the coalition, namely the choice for the coalition threshold or the
higher  general  threshold.  This  favours  large  coalitions (and  governments that  mirror the  composition in
Parliament) that are not dependent upon party discipline, so that rather m' < m << k. 
The symbols and small formulas are as follows. The approximation of s / s' = n / (n - w) with q = n / s and w
= e q should be an identity when q is not rounded.
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
n number of voters = Σ v s number of seats
w nr. wasted = e q e s − Σ Floor@v ê qD
n' n − w s' s − e
c nr. wasted voters of coalition k nr. coalition seats
w' w − c q n ê s
f 1 ê 2 n ê Hn − wL m Ceiling@f sD
s ê s' approx. n ê Hn − wL m' Ceiling@f' sD
f' f@w'D θ Max@m', kD
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There is a strong argument that once the coalition has more than a majority in the voters then the issue of
void seats  is  not relevant  anymore, and certainly not the  void seats  in  the  non-coalition, so that  simple
majority suffices and qualified majority is out of order. This however assumes that the coalition parties will
agree on all topics. If they indeed agree and when they would also pass the qualified majority then that
argument is immaterial. If they do not always agree then the argument of the wasted vote bites again. In the
assignment of empty coalition seats some coalition parties won at the cost of remainders of other coalition
partners. If they do not agree then this was a wrong assignment. The qualified majority then provides some
cushion, either within the coalition (to entice them to agree) or when a coalition party tries to find support
across the coalition barrier. When it is a free topic that is not crucial to the coalition agreement (so that there
need  not  be  unity)  then  the  original  qualified  majority should hold  again.  The  only possibly awkward
situation is that k < m' meaning that the majority coalition does not reach the coalition qualified majority.
This appears to have happened in Holland. The cause is that the coalition cannot claim sufficient empty seats
so that too many remain available to drive up the threshold. The proper answer is to form a larger coalition.
For the Dutch coalition, the qualified majority based upon the  turnout is 52.7% or 80 seats.  Due to the
formation of the coalition the threshold of 81 drops to 80 - while it is 79.0076 except for the Ceiling func-
tion. The coalition has only 2.4 of the 10 void seats so that the other 7.6 are for the non-coalition. With
highest averages the coalition has 5 remaining seats but 2.6 too much. With Sainte-Laguë & Webster they
get 79 seats and thus are 1 short of the qualified majority threshold. The theoretical void seats rounded to 8
now belong only to the non-coalition parties.  It is a  bit paradoxical  that a  majority coalition with 51.6%
support in the turnout may be blocked by a qualified majority threshold of 52.7 in the turnout but the reason-
ing is as stated. 
QualifiedMajority@Coalition, pthD
:Fraction Ø 4927 499
9355 112
, RealØ 0.526717, IntegerØ 80, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 8>
:fs = 4927 499
9355 112
150 êê N, Ceiling@fsD>
879.0076, 80<
SainteLagueWebster@Drop@pth, −1D, Drop@Voters, −1D, −150D
841, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 3, 9<
Drop@Coalition@D, −1D . %
79
PM. The outcome for this Dutch coalition is remarkable. When writing this paper it was at first confusing but
then it helped sharpen the coalition qualified majority rule. It must be observed that the calculations involve
some rounding and thus might be subject to some degree of arbitrariness. It makes sense though to take the
Ceiling on f ' s and let the implied theoretical void seats be the residual. The current fraction is almost 79.
We can imagine a threshold Max[Floor[f ' s], k] rather than Ceiling as is the conventional translation of “at
least”. Then the threshold would drop to the coalition size 79 - provided that they all vote the same. Con-
versely it may be wiser to adhere to the conventions and accept the conclusion that the coalition should be
larger.  Again  we  note  the  competition between  representation  and  ease  of  decision  making. Indeed,  a
political committee might propose that the empty seats of the coalition are determined as c = Ceiling[2.4] =
3, and that q is determined from the seats rather than the voters. The coalition survives. However, we can
sense that there is an element of appropriation in that proposal and this clarifies that we should reject  it.
Appendix C contains some more details of the approach and a restatement in somewhat other words.
(3) The blanco and invalid votes may or may not be included in the "Void" group. Under Dutch electoral law
they are not included in the electoral quota but it makes sense to include them.
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It appears that the 16315 blanco and invalid votes are important here. When they are not regarded as wasted
and when they are thus excluded from consideration (as is done in Holland) then the threshold drops to 79
seats;  and Sainte-Laguë & Webster is not affected  so that the coalition now succeeds.  (Calculations not
shown.) 
(4) Should we neglect the voters who stayed home ? If we include them then the threshold rises and more
parties  might drop  from Parliament,  while  the  seats  are  affected  overall.  Non-voters  can  be  randomly
distributed over parties but there might be a systematic element. The general argument is that people know
about the election and that they know that they will be neglected if they do not vote. They balance the costs
and benefits, and when they don’t vote then this is a conscious decision; so that the no-shows can be elimi-
nated. Either you are a rational being and we respect your decision or you are irrational and should not be in
the electorate. However, if you do not see a party that adequately represents you then it is dubious whether it
is really better to vote for another party that is available. There may not be a next best. Creating a new party
comes at  high costs.  Thus  the  cost-benefit  evaluation of the no-shows is  rather  awkward. Their  options
would really improve if blanco votes would result into void seats.  In the mean time, while voters lack that
option, we cannot use the empirically observed numbers of blanco voting as properly reflecting the true state.
See Appendix C for a calculation of the non-voters.
6. Districts
When it is argued that districts should reflect popular sentiment but this need not be the case for the grand
total, then the case for proportional representation is enhanced by the implied irrationality.
Districts can cause curious results, at least when seen from the viewpoint of proportionality. For example, let
there be 10 districts with each 1000 persons and let parties Red and Blue have the following numbers of
voters. Red would gain 6 districts but Blue would gain 64% of the vote. 
K Red 600 600 600 600 600 600 0 0 0 0 3600
Blue 400 400 400 400 400 400 1000 1000 1000 1000 6400
O
Possible options for this example are: (a) randomly assign 2 of the 6 districts to Blue, or (b) to extend the
number of seats with 6 to a total of 16, so that Red had 6 seats and Blue 10. It is optional again to assign
those  6 additional  seats  to  the  districts  or  not,  so that  districts  might get  more representatives.  Perhaps
geography allows a better solution, by fusing some districts, since a better approximation might be {3, 6}.
Such approximation is a mere mathematical exercise and one would look for a solution that enhances the
sense of representation of the people involved.
83, 6< ê 9.
80.333333, 0.666667<
86, 10< ê 16.
80.375, 0.625<
Flexibility thus is required to resolve strange outcomes. A drawback is that when the voters have unstable
views then the number of free seats might have to be adjusted in each election. If Red gains 501 and Blue
gains 499 voters in every district then Red would have 10 district seats and Blue would need 9 free seats. It
is an empirical issue whether this would be a practical problem. But a 51% versus 49% split would be an
extreme case and might be taken to set the stable number of district and free seats.
Let us formulate some rules for the compromise case. Other names for compromise cases are hybrid, mixed-
member proportional or additional-members systems. Overall  proportionality would be the first  condition
and representation of the district is secondary. Given aggregate proportionality, additional criteria on districts
have mainly consequences for the distribution within the parties.
A possible scheme (for say 150 seats) is this:
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The national results for proportionality generate the number of elected candidates per party.
2. 100 Seats are allocated via single seat districts of approximately equal size while 50 are for “overflow”. From Section 
2 we then know that p = 2/3 so that r = 3/2 and h = 3/4 = 75%.
3. Candidates with more than 75% of the electoral quota are considered elected (subject to the national party total).
4. Districts are subsequently processed in the order of the highest number of votes for a single candidate per district.
5. Candidates with a majority (more than 50%) in their district are elected (even if this is less than above 75% of the 
quota, given some variety in district size). Even, when a party in the district has a majority but no single candidate of 
that party has a majority, then the candidate in that party is taken with the highest number of votes.
6. Of the remaining candidates for parties of which the elected number is not exhausted, the candidate with the highest 
number of votes in the district (plurality, not necessarily majority) is the winner.
7. If the remaining seats per party are not exhausted then candidates are elected with the higher number of voters.
A more involved example is the following. Let there be 3 districts and 5 seats (of which 2 overflow), and 3
parties A, B and C with 5 candidates each (labelled as A1, A2, ...). In district 1 the list of party A can be A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, in district 2 the list can be e.g. A2, A1, A3, A4, A5, and in district 3 the list can be e.g. A3,
A4, A5, A1, A2, all depending upon the sentiments of the local party machine. Let us assume that voters
only vote for candidates that lead in some district, and that the results are:
District 1 8A1, B1, C1< 8100, 99, 90<
District 2 8A2, B2, C2< 890, 98, 30<
District 3 8A3, B3, C3< 885, 87, 60<
The results per party are:
Voters = Plus @@ HLast ê@ %L
8275, 284, 180<
We can  compare  3  respectively  5  seats,  with  proportionality, simple  districts  and  proportionality with
districts. The issue of thresholds and qualified majority may distract so we drop this from the discussion. It is
useful to have a test on majority. The DutchParliament routine is adequate. We should set the remainder
method to Sainte-Laguë & Webster but it is conceptually simpler to use the default HighestAverages (the
intended application). In this example party C does not pass the electoral quota threshold in a Parliament of 3
seats but still will be elected.
With 3 respectively 5 seats, proportional representation gives:
8DutchParliament@3D, ElectoralQuota@D êê N<
ElectoralQuota::min: Assignment is to party below quota: 80, 0, 1<
881, 1, 1<, 246.333<
8DutchParliament@5D, ElectoralQuota@D êê N<
882, 2, 1<, 147.8<
Appendix D, subsection 1, provides more detail for the distribution of winners over districts and subsequent
calculations, and they are summarized in the table below. With 3 seats, there is a difference in 2 candidates
between all methods. With proportionality party C is represented  but not with the simple district method.
Pure proportionality selects top candidates B1 and C1 but proportionality with districts selects B2 and C3;
and in the simple district method C3 loses from B3.  With 5 seats, B1 only turns up under pure proportional-
ity.
Method 3 Seats 5 Seats
Proportionality A1, B1, C1 A1, A2, B1, B2, C1
Simple district H pluralityL A1, B2, B3 A1, A2, B2, B3, C1
Proportionality with districts A1, B2, C3 A1, A2, B2, B3, C1
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The outcomes thus are all across the board but there is some system in them. With two free seats the simple
district method already becomes more proportional (C1 appears).  If that outcome is considered preferable
then it is more logical to use the proportional district algorithm because of its checks on majority and explicit
imposition of proportionality.
Since no candidate has the electoral quota their election depends upon party or district. If there is a national
list then they might be selected by rank on the list. Alternatively if electoral support is relevant then A1, A2,
B1, B2 and C1 are elected. This means that no leading candidate in district 3 is elected. Suppose now that it
is argued that districts are important. Hence, if above algorithm for assignment per district is used then the
following happens. The highest scores per candidate per district are 100, 98 and 87, and thus districts 1, 2
and 3 are processed in that order. In district 1, A1 has the highest score and is elected. In district 2, B2 has
the highest score and is elected. In district 3, B3 has the highest score and is elected. Selected from overflow
are, based upon overall proportionality and electoral support, A2 and C1. The introduction of the districts
thus causes that B3 is elected instead of B1. B1 suffers from competitor A1 in the same district 1. It seems
advisable that B1 moves home to district 3. If this happens then there is no difference with direct propor-
tional representation in terms of labels. There can be a political difference since we cannot simply assume
that B1 and B3 really are exchangeable. Perhaps B1 became popular because of district 1, perhaps B1 will
be politically motivated to cultivate district 3 issues once moved there, but then loses popularity. In principle
these are people and political issues and not just labels. These are the details that are difficult to model but
that motivate much of the discussion on this topic.
7. Other angles
The discussion about the change in electoral system, in Holland towards districts and in the UK towards
proportionality, also contains other aspects that are perhaps not quite related to the issues of districts and
proportionality. The general denominator seems to be ‘more power to the voter’. If that is the intention then
this goal can also be furthered by other measures than the rules of accounting. It suffices to mention some, in
order to indicate the range of possibilities.
One aspect is information. Enhancing the quality of information can help the electorate to make informed
decisions. Elsewhere I have discussed the option of an Economic Supreme Court, with a position in the
Constitution alongside the Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers.
One  aspect  is  the  frequency  of  elections.  Annual  elections  after  approval  of  the  current  budget  would
enhance  voting power  compared  to  the  current  four  year  cycle.  Political  theorists  and  practitioners  are
worried about myopia in the electorate. However, a party that puts in some effort on explaining its position
could well generate stable support. It would seem better that a longer term policy is supported by informed
citizens than by forced impotence.
Other angles in the discussion concern the possible sources of confusion. There can be confusion between
single and multiple seats. There appears to be confusion about approval voting and the Penrose square root
rule. Of fundamental importance is the confusion about the interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
In the didactics, such issues have to be dealt with. A generally useful didactic approach is to start with the
optimal system and then show the consequences from deviation. However, the notion of an optimal system
sounds boring and might kill interest. The voting paradoxes then are very useful to spur motivation. 
8. Conclusion
The following considerations play a key role in the didactics of multiple seats elections:
(1) If you are sensitive to the majority condition (a party with more than 50% in the electoral vote should
also have a majority in Parliament) then you are sensitive to a key aspect of proportional representation.
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(2) If you reject plurality (greatest number of votes instead of majority) then you are sensitive to proportional
representation.  Plurality in districts can put minorities into Parliament that lose out under  proportionality.
This  openness to minorities however can also be achieved by lowering the threshold (adding free  seats)
which also allows some control over that openness.
(3)  If you are  sensitive to the aggregation problem, in that even majority in districts does not prevent  a
minority from gaining a majority in Parliament, then you are sensitive to a key aspect of proportionality.
(4) The argument for districts would be in the local political base of candidates such that they contribute to
policy making in a different  manner than when they depend upon the party leadership. The argument for
districts does not reside in numerical issues but in the association of people with their region and history, or,
for the European Union, with their nation. This can still be allowed for. At the same time there can be lists
for parties that want to collect votes over the districts.
(5) The compromise method with free seats seems feasible. District seats can be supplemented with non-
district seats to attain overall proportionality (to a close approximation). It is an empirical issue whether the
required number of free seats is stable over elections. Simulations with these smaller routines suggests that
1/3 free seats could be adequate but reality is known for its surprises. 
The  simple district  method of plurality can allow small minorities to be represented  that drop out under
proportionality even with more free  seats. The  district algorithm for proportionality still causes  that each
district has a district winner (if districts are not too small and the political views not too distributed over too
many parties, so that at least one party has the electoral quota). The algorithm however also causes that such
small minorities drop out (and this cannot really be amended by lowering the threshold since then too many
would be elected). This requires a sharper line between minorities that get a vote in Parliament and minori-
ties that retain the right to be heard.
(6) The literature spends a great deal of attention to methods like greatest remainder, higher averages and
Sainte-Laguë & Webster and their mathematical properties for approximating a distribution but a remarkable
less deal of attention to the methods of pure and qualified majority thresholds while the latter appear rather
proper in terms of content. The QualifiedThreshold method discussed here appears a decent yardstick for the
notion of proportionality.
(7)  The  selection of Parliament (multiple seats)  and the Premier or President  (single seat)  should not be
confused. Optimal seems to have proportional Parliament and then let Parliament select the Premier via more
complex single seat methods (e.g. Borda Fixed Point). The didactics on this are more involved for readers
used to a Presidential  system with districts.  A drawback is that what is considered optimal is subject  to
personal opinion. It must be empirically tested whether that suggestion of optimality indeed is the case, i.e.
that people agree, and a condition is that the people in the test who state their preference on what is optimal
really understand the issue.
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Appendix A. Routines
Economics@"Voting`MultipleSeats`"D
Cool`Voting`MultipleSeats`
AddToVoid MultipleSeatLegend QualifiedThreshold
Assignment MultipleSeatsCase RelabelSeats
BelowQuotaToVoid NaiveAssignment RemainderTable
CheckMultipleSeats NumberOfParties RemainderToVoid
Coalition NumberOfSeats RemainingSeats
DiscardedVoters NVoters RemainingVoters
DropLastParty
Options$MultipleSeats-
Case RVoters
DutchParliament
Options$QualifiedThres-
hold SainteLagueWebster
ElectoralQuota Parliament Seats
Electorate PartyLabels SeatsVectorGate
GreatestRemainder ProperMajority VoidSeats
HighestAverage ProportionalMethod Voters
ImpliedQuota PureThreshold VotersDensityPlot
ImpliedVoidSeats QualifiedMajority WastedVote
Economics@"Voting`Districts`"D
Cool`Voting`Districts`
CandidatesPerDistrict DistrictPlurality NumberOfFreeSeats
CheckDistrict
DistrictPluralityRunner-
Up ProportionalAssignment
District DistrictQuotaFraction RandomDistricts
DistrictAssignment DistrictRemainders Score
DistrictExample Districts SetDistrict
DistrictLabeledScores LabelsToSeats
SimpleDistrictAssignme-
nt
DistrictLabels
NumberOfCandidatesP-
erParty
DistrictMajority NumberOfDistricts
? ProportionalAssignment
ProportionalAssignment@D sets NumberOfSeats = NumberOfCandidatesPerParty@D
ProportionalAssignment@sD sets NumberOfSeats = s, and assigns seats while disregarding
districts. The candidates per party are ordered by popularity and the seats per party
are assigned to the highest scores. Default ProportionalMethod -> DutchParliament
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? SimpleDistrictAssignment
SimpleDistrictAssignment@D sets NumberOfSeats = NumberOfCandidatesPerParty@D
SimpleDistrictAssignment@sD sets NumberOfSeats = s, and applies the following
principes: H1L Per district DistrictPlurality is applied, H2L For the free seats HighestAverage
is applied, and assigned to party candidates with the highest remaining votes
? DistrictAssignment
DistrictAssignment@D sets NumberOfSeats = NumberOfCandidatesPerParty@D
DistrictAssignment@sD sets NumberOfSeats = s, and applies the following principes:
H1L The national results calculated as in
ProportionalAssignment generate the number of elected candidates per party.
H2L Candidates with more than 75% of the electoral quota are
considered elected Hsubject to the national party totalL.
H3L Districts are subsequently processed in the order of the highest
number of voters for a single candidate per district.
H4L Candidates with a majority Hmore than 50%L in their district are elected Heven if this
is less than this 75% of the quotaL. Even, when a party in the district has a majority
but no single candidate of that party, then the candidate in that party is taken with
the greatest number of voters. This check on a majority is done before next criteria.
H5L Of the remaining candidates, the candidate with the highest number of
voters in the district Hplurality, not necessarily majorityL is the winner
Hwhen the number of candidates in the party is not exhaustedL.
H6L If the remaining seats per party are not exhausted then
candidates are elected with the higher number of voters.
The routine presumes parameters and data like set in SetDistrict. Default options are
DistrictQuotaFraction -> 75%Hfor step 2L, RemainingSeats -> HighestAverage,
ProportionalMethod -> DutchParliament Hfor the national result in step 1L
? Parliament
Parliament can be set by the user to some method,
either as Parliament = method or Parliament@x___D := method@xD
Appendix B. Variants for the Dutch case
ü Set the problem
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
dp = Seats@D;
Coalition@Set, "A", "B", "H"D
8List Ø 8A, B, H<, NVotersØ 5084 619, ShareØ 0.516799, SeatsHNLØ 77.5198, SeatsHParliamentLØ 80<
ü Variant with greatest remainder
Let us assign remaining seats via the greatest remainder instead of the highest average. Two smaller parties
gain. Note that party L now gets a seat although it does not pass the threshold of the electoral quota.
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dpsurp = DutchParliament@RemainingSeats → GreatestRemainderD
840, 32, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 3, 1, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dif = dpsurp − dp
8-1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dif DutchParties
8-Christen Democratisch Appèl HCDAL, -Partij van de Arbeid HPvdAL, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Partij voor de Dieren, EénNL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
ü Variant with Sainte-Laguë & Webster
Let us assign remaining seats via Sainte-Laguë & Webster. The same two smaller parties gain.
dpslw = DutchParliament@RemainingSeats → SainteLagueWebsterD
840, 32, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 3, 1, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dif = dpslw − dp
8-1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dif DutchParties
8-Christen Democratisch Appèl HCDAL, -Partij van de Arbeid HPvdAL, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Partij voor de Dieren, EénNL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
When we apply the routine starting from zero (thus without the first step of naive assignment) then we get
the same result.
dpslworg = SainteLagueWebster@Set, 150D
840, 32, 22, 25, 0, 7, 3, 6, 2, 0, 3, 1, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
ü Variant with 100 seats
Given the need for budget cuts there are some ideas of reducing the number of seats to 100. Then the ruling
coalition would have 28 + 22 + 4 = 54 seats. With 100 seats and the method of St.Laguë & Webster the
majority is reduced to 51. 
dp100 = DutchParliament@100D
828, 22, 15, 17, 0, 4, 2, 4, 1, 0, 1, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
Coalition@D . %
54
dpslw100 = DutchParliament@100, RemainingSeats → SainteLagueWebsterD
826, 21, 15, 16, 0, 5, 2, 4, 2, 0, 2, 1, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
Coalition@D . %
51
This result also arises when we use the method from zero without the first naive assignment. 
SainteLagueWebster@100D
826, 21, 15, 16, 0, 5, 2, 4, 2, 0, 2, 1, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
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dif = dpslw100 − dp100
8-2, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
dif DutchParties
8-2 Christen Democratisch Appèl HCDAL, -Partij van de Arbeid HPvdAL, 0,
-SP HSocialistische PartijL, 0, Groenlinks, 0, 0, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij HSGPL,
0, Partij voor de Dieren, EénNL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0<
ü Variant with 2 void seats
What would it mean when the wasted votes would be translated in void seats ? Let us eliminate the parties
that did not pass the threshold and replace  them by their  sum including the invalid /  blanco votes. This
amounts to two seats. The quota is affected and the percentage electoral support for the coalition drops a bit.
BelowQuotaToVoid@WastedVote → WastedVote@NDD êê Last
8Void, 137 234<
As mentioned above, but now proven, the two void seats are at the cost of the two largest parties, CDA and
PvdA. The ruling coalition drops from 80 to 40 + 32 + 6 = 78 seats, a bit less comfortable. PM 1. If we do
not include the blanco and invalid votes then the difference is 1 seat. PM 2. We reset the number of seats
since above we reduced them to 100. The global variables Seats[ ] and Coalition[ ] have automatically been
adjusted to the new length.
dpalt = DutchParliament@150D
840, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 2, 9, 2<
Coalition@D . %
78
If in addition Sainte-Laguë & Webster is used then the Party for the Animals wins a seat and the majority of
the ruling coalition drops to 77 seats. (Also for the method of the greatest remainder, not shown.)
dpslw2 = SainteLagueWebster@Set, 150D;
dif = dpslw2 − dpalt
8-1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0<
This table compares the official assignment with the Sainte-Laguë & Webster plus 2 empty seats. PM. This
table assumes a uniform quota so that the remainders on the left differ from above.
RemainderTable@Seats@D , dpslw2D
Voters Seats@1D Remainder@1D SeatFraction@1D Diff . Seats@2D Remainder@2D SeatFraction@2D
A 2608 573 41 -85 126 -1.296 -2 39 46 274 0.704
B 2085 077 33 -83 022 -1.264 -1 32 -17 322 -0.264
C 1443 312 22 -2087 -0.032 0 22 -2087 -0.032
D 1630 803 25 -11 696 -0.178 0 25 -11 696 -0.178
F 453 054 7 -6845 -0.104 0 7 -6845 -0.104
G 193 232 3 -3867 -0.059 0 3 -3867 -0.059
H 390 969 6 -3230 -0.049 0 6 -3230 -0.049
I 153 266 2 21 867 0.333 0 2 21 867 0.333
K 179 988 2 48 589 0.74 1 3 -17 111 -0.26
M 579 490 9 -11 809 -0.18 0 9 -11 809 -0.18
Void 137 234 0 137 234 2.089 2 2 5835 0.089
Total 9 854 998 150 8 0 0 150 9 0
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ElectoralQuota@D êê N
65 700.
ü All combined
When we combine the variants of greatest remainder or Sainte-Laguë & Webster, a total of 100 seats, and 2
void seats, then 3 seats are reassigned but the ruling coalition still maintains 51 seats in the Parliament of 100
seats. In principle a 51.7% majority in the turnout might be lost since, as said, the rules for Dutch Parliament
check on a majority of a single party (or combination) before the election and not of a coalition formed after
the election. (Calculations not shown.)
ü On the use of the routines
? GreatestRemainder
GreatestRemainder@Hq,L a, vD for voters v and an assignment a of seats: assigns
an additional seat to the group with the greatest remainder HsurplusL in v - q a
GreatestRemainder@Hq,L a, v, mD continues this process for additional m seats, step by step.
GreatestRemainder@Hq,L a, mD is the same as GreatestRemainder@Hq,L a, Voters, mD
GreatestRemainder@Hq,L aD for an assignment a of seats, uses v = Voters and q = ElectoralQuota@D
If a = 8< then a zero assignment is used.
If m is negative then -m is assumed to be
the total number of seats and the addition must be -m - Plus üü a
Default is the ElectoralQuota@D, the number of voters divided by the available seats
Hsimple or Hare quotaL. Alternatives might be to Hagenbach-Bischoff Hseats + 1L
or Imperali Hseats + 2L. This routine takes a as given and independent of q though
? SainteLagueWebster
SainteLagueWebster@a, vD for voters v and an assignment a of seats:
assigns an additional seat to the group with the greatest value in v ê H2 a + 1L
SainteLagueWebster@a, v, mD continues this process for m seats, step by step.
SainteLagueWebster@a, mD is the same as SainteLagueWebster@a, Voters, mD
SainteLagueWebster@aD for an assignment a of seats, uses v = Voters
If a = 8< then a zero assignment is used
If m is negative then -m is assumed to be
the total number of seats and the addition must be -m - Plus üü a
SainteLagueWebster@D creates the zero assignment a = 80, ... 0< for
the NumberOfParties, and calls SainteLagueWebster@aD
SainteLagueWebster@mD starts with the zero assignment and allocates m seats
SainteLagueWebster@Set H,mLD first sets NumberOfParties = Length@VotersD
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? Apportionment
Apportionment@n, lis, min:0, max:nD distributes n over m = Length@lisD portions p œ Integers,
min <= p <= max and Add@pD == n, such that a function f is minimized. Implemented
are Function -> f on s = p ê Add@pD and r = lis ê Add@lisD, for f Hsummed overL:
Automatic or "Chi2" gives ChiSquare or Sainte-Lague Hs - rL^2 ê r
"Rel" gives Webster Abs@s - rD ê r
"LS" gives least squares Hs - rL^2
"Abs" gives Abs@s - rD or Hamilton ê Hare ê Largest remainders.
There is no test on zero's in lis
Default option Take -> NMinimize may also be Minimize or Grid, and StartValues ->
Automatic may also be None or a list of values Hor min of max rangesL. The default
range takes the Floor@r nD - ran and Ceiling@r nD + ran Hchange with Range -> ran,
default 1L. Minimize will not work with StartValues -> Automatic: use None, but
Automatic can still be useful to show what the routine does. See Results for details
Apportionment@Grid, n, lis, min:0, max:nD uses a grid of that range,
generates all integer combinations, selects the minimum
Appendix C. Details of pure and qualified threshold
ü A note on dependence
? VoidSeats
VoidSeats@EquationsD gives the basic relations between the turnout NVoters@0D
and the new base NVoters@1D = NVoters@0D - WastedVote@0D when the void seats
are replaced by a condition on qualified majority. With majority as the number of
voters m = NVoters@0D ê 2 there is the ratio QualifiedMajority@D = m ê NVoters@1D.
With N for the NumberOfSeats, the ElectoralQuota@0D = NVoters@0D ê N. These three
equations allow us to define routines ImpliedQuota and ImpliedVoidSeats. Use:
H1L Solve@VoidSeats@EquationsD, 8WastedVote@0D, QualifiedMajority@D<, 8NVoters@0D <D êê Simplify
H2L Solve@VoidSeats@EquationsD, 8WastedVote@0D, ElectoralQuota@0D<, 8NVoters@0D<D êê Simplify
Let us use short symbols:
Clear@n, s, w, f, qD;
repl = 8NVoters → n, N → s, WastedVote@0D → w,
QualifiedMajority@D → f, ElectoralQuota @0D → q<;
eqs = VoidSeats@EquationsD ê. repl
:nH1L  nH0L - w, q  nH0L
s
, f 
nH0L
2 nH1L >
Solutions are:
Solve@eqs, 8f<, 8q, n@1D<D ê. repl êê Simplify
:: f Ø nH0L
2 HnH0L - wL >>
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Solve@eqs, 8w, f<, 8n@0D<D ê. repl êê Simplify
::w Ø q s - nH1L, f Ø q s
2 nH1L >>
With e = w / q and s = n[0] / q so that we also have e  = (1 - 
1
2 f
) s.
Solve@eqs, 8w, q<, 8n@1D<D ê. repl êê Simplify
::w Ø 1 - 1
2 f
nH0L, q Ø nH0L
s
>>
Here e = w / q = (2 f - 1) n[1] / q and thus seems a function of f and q but this neglects their interdependence.
Solve@eqs, 8w, q<, 8n@0D<D ê. repl êê Simplify
::w Ø H2 f - 1L nH1L, q Ø 2 f nH1L
s
>>
ü A note on serial exclusion
We noted three sources for the wasted vote and can eliminate them step by step or all at once. In step by step
exclusion then the factors for qualified majority must be multiplied. When we test whether a party has a
majority in the original vote then it suffices to check in that original vote, sum the waste, and correct with the
cumulated factor. 
1 ê 2 Hold@n@0D ê Hn@0D − w@0DL D Hold@n@1D ê Hn@1D − w@1DLD
1
2
HoldB nH0L
nH0L - wH0L FHoldB
nH1L
nH1L - wH1L F
% ê. n@1D → n@0D − w@0D
1
2
HoldB nH0L
nH0L - wH0L FHoldB
nH0L - wH0L
HnH0L - wH0LL - wH1L F
% êê ReleaseHold
nH0L
2 HnH0L - wH0L - wH1LL
ü A closer look at the components
Above discussion of the principles relies on some subroutines. Here we will look at those in more detail.
This discussion comes at the price of repetition but there seems to be no way around it.
? AddToVoid
AddToVoid@r_IntegerD adds r voters to a Hpossibly createdL
party "Void", in PartyLabels@D and Voters, and also Seats@D with value 0 if
that is a List with the appropriate length. This is used in BelowQuotaToVoid
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? BelowQuotaToVoid
BelowQuotaToVoid@D checks which parties in Voters have less than
ElectoralQuota@D, removes those and allocates those voters to the "Void" party
Hthat is created if it does not yet existL; PartyLabels@D and Voters are updated,
and also Seats@D and Coalition@ListD if those are a List with the appropriate length
BelowQuotaToVoid@WastedVote -> wD first includes w Hnormally the invalid or blanco votesL
? RemainderToVoid
RemainderToVoid@v, nsD assigns seats using Floor@NaiveAssignment@v, nsDD and
assigns the remainder to the "Void" party, assumed to be the last in PartyLabels@D
RemainderToVoid@D uses defaults v = Voters and ns = NumberOfSeats
This will be helpful to translate the pure threshold into qualified majority decision making.
? QualifiedMajority
QualifiedMajority@ns, neD for number of seats ns and virtual number of empty seats
ne, gives the majority threshold found by ns ê 2 * Hns ê Hns - neLL êê Ceiling Hat leastL
QualifiedMajority@neD uses ns = NumberOfSeats
QualifiedMajority@Fraction, ns, neD gives the fraction 1ê2 * ns ê Hns - neL Hno CeilingL
QualifiedMajority@f, shareD tests whether the share of voters gives
a majority Hmore than f of the votersL and generates the appropriate number
of seats as Floor@f NumberOfSeats + 1D Hwith f = 1ê2 this is ProperMajorityL
QualifiedMajority@Set, fD sets the options using fraction f
Options@QualifiedMajorityD can be used to store results. The majority threshold as a fraction
uses the "more than" H>L condition and as an integer uses the "at least" condition H>=L
QualifiedMajority@NVoters » Coalition, seatsD determines the qual. maj. in the Voters for an
assigment of seats. It requires seats from bqtv = BelowQuotaToVoid@WastedVote ->
WastedVote@NDD; fna = Floor@NaiveAssignment@DD; or from PureThreshold@WastedVote
-> WastedVote@NDD; see Results@QualifiedMajority, NVoters » CoalitionD
ü Pure threshold method
? PureThreshold
PureThreshold@D assigns all voters below the quota and in the remainders to the "Void" party
Hcreated if neededL. It uses BelowQuotaToVoid so that the irrelevant parties are removed
PureThreshold@WastedVote -> wD first adds w voters to the "Void" party
PM. The routine changes Voters and repeated addition of the wasted voters causes different results
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
pth = PureThreshold@WastedVote → WastedVote@NDD
839, 31, 21, 24, 6, 2, 5, 2, 2, 8, 10<
Coalition@D . %
75
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ü Qualified (majority) threshold method
? QualifiedThreshold
QualifiedThreshold@D translates the void seats of PureThreshold@D into a qualified majority
and fills the seats with SainteLagueWebster Hrequiring that each party passes the
threshold to get 1 seatL. WastedVote -> w allows inclusion of voters not in Voters. Use
Hold -> True HdefaultL to maintain the length of Voters. NB. Output is the list 8Seats
-> ..., QualifiedMajority -> ...<. Possibly use SeatsVectorGate to process this output
QualifiedThreshold@MethodD takes basic assignment a = Floor@Voters ê qD for q the
ElectoralQuota, checks with QualifiedMajority and then applies SainteLagueWebster on
the remaining voters and seats. It uses the defaults already set or from the options.
All parties must have at least q voters and thus 1 seat Hfor SainteLagueWebster
can allocate seats to void partiesL. If option ElectoralQuota -> Automatic then q =
2 f NVoters@D ê NumberOfSeats, otherwise f = q ê 2 NumberOfSeats ê NVoters@D. All
nonrepresented are collected in the remaining seats, giving the corrected threshold
QualifiedThreshold@Set H, WastedVote -> wLD calls BelowQuotaToVoid, then determines the
ElectoralQuota, VoidSeats and the QualifiedMajority fraction when all void seats are
reassigned to proper parties; these outcomes are set in Options@QualifiedThresholdD.
Subsequently DropLastParty@D strips the void voters from Voters and PartyLabels@D,
so that a call to QualifiedThreshold@MethodD can generate the final result
QualifiedThreshold@Hv, L nD first sets HVoters = v andL NumberOfSeats
= n, and then calls QualifiedThreshold@D
Option RemainingSeats might also be set to GreatestRemainder or HighestAverage.
Such application is to remaining seats and not from zero onwards
We split the problem into separate issues: (1) the majority condition, (2) the relocation of empty seats. Since
decisions are based upon majority the first is the crucial criterion. When that is solved then the second can be
reduced to the mathematical issue of filling the seats. 
The  10 void seats are equivalent to a qualified majority threshold of 81 seats. The coalition can claim 2
empty seats and the remaining 8 empty seats cause an after-election “coalition qualified majority” of 80. The
opposition might make arrangements to assign their empty seats amongst themselves but by doing so they
reduce the qualified majority threshold and help the coalition. For them there is the mirror argument that it is
unlikely that they too will always vote the same way so that the qualified majority rule applies to them too.
QualifiedMajority ê@ 810, 8<
881, 80<
The 10 void seats can be reassigned to the parties using the principle of Sainte-Laguë & Webster. Then the
coalition has 41 + 32 + 6 = 79 seats. (Note that this differs from Appendix B, the original application of
Sainte-Laguë & Webster starting from zero; there party A got 40 seats and party L got 1 seat. But L does not
pass the threshold and should rather not be included; it is a party and not a state.) 
slw = SainteLagueWebster@Drop@pth, −1D, Drop@Voters, −1D, Last@pthDD
841, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 3, 9<
Drop@Coalition@D, −1D . %
79
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In sum: the coalition has a 51.6% majority in the voters (including the blanco and  invalid votes) and 79 seats
in Parliament with a qualified majority threshold of either 80 or 81. The reason for the 79 seats is that Sainte-
Laguë & Webster does not check on the majority condition, not just  for a single party but neither for a
coalition.
QualifiedMajority@Coalition, pthD
:Fraction Ø 4927 499
9355 112
, RealØ 0.526717, IntegerØ 80, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 8>
Results@QualifiedMajority, CoalitionD
8AssignmentØ 839, 31, 21, 24, 6, 2, 5, 2, 2, 8, 10<, NVotersØ 9854 998,
RemainingVotersØ 846 274, 48 378, 63 613, 54 004, 58 855, 61 833, 62 470, 21 867, 48 589, 53 891<,
Last Ø 137 234, TotalØ 657 008, CoalitionØ 157 122, WastedVoteØ 499 886<
PM. When we write routines that may switch between e.g. either DutchParliament or QualifiedThreshold
then we must account for the different output formats. Instead of ProportionalMethod Ø DutchParliament we
might use ProportionalMethod Ø (Seats /. QualifiedThreshold[###]&). Or we might internally program the
routine to do the selection itself, so that the input provider can use ProportionalMethod Ø QualifiedThresh-
old. It depends upon whether the qualified majority threshold is important for that routine or not.
? SeatsVectorGate
SeatsVectorGate@lisD checks whether lis is a vector or a list of rules
8Seats -> vector,...<, then puts out that vector, otherwise prints the input and
returns $Failed. Mixed vector input like 8a, Seats -> b, c< is not intercepted
Parliament@x___D := SeatsVectorGate@QualifiedThreshold@xDD
ü The Apportionment routine
We can find the Sainte-Laguë & Webster outcome also by direct optimization. If we apply this routine then
rather with the shorter list of parties than the long list above. This gives a local minimum in the area around
the naive assignment.
Apportionment@150, Drop@Voters, −1D, 1, Range → 3D
80.000626913, 841, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 3, 9<<
ü Non-voters
Including the no-shows has a dramatic effect. 
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 31D;
pth = PureThreshold@WastedVote → electorate − NVoters@DD
831, 25, 17, 19, 5, 2, 4, 1, 2, 7, 37<
Coalition@D . %
60
Coalition@"Magic", electorate = 12 264 503, 60D
Share Seats
Electorate 0.415 62.187
Valid vote 0.415 62.187
Parliament 0.4 60.
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RemainderTable@Seats@D, pthD
Voters Seats@1D Remainder@1D SeatFraction@1D Diff . Seats@2D Remainder@2D SeatFraction@2D
A 2608 573 41 -743 724 -9.096 -10 31 73 910 0.904
B 2085 077 33 -613 113 -7.499 -8 25 40 994 0.501
C 1443 312 22 -355 481 -4.348 -5 17 53 335 0.652
D 1630 803 25 -413 280 -5.055 -6 19 77 300 0.945
F 453 054 7 -119 289 -1.459 -2 5 44 238 0.541
G 193 232 3 -52 058 -0.637 -1 2 29 706 0.363
H 390 969 6 -99 611 -1.218 -2 4 63 916 0.782
I 153 266 2 -10 260 -0.125 -1 1 71 503 0.875
K 179 988 2 16 462 0.201 0 2 16 462 0.201
M 579 490 9 -156 380 -1.913 -2 7 7147 0.087
Void 2 546 739 0 2546 739 31.148 37 37 -478 505 -5.852
Total 12 264 503 150 5 -0.001 0 150 6 -0.001
Assigning those 37 seats to the parties gives the coalition 41 + 32 + 6 = 79 seats as before but now the
qualified majority is 100 (conveniently two-thirds) and the coalition qualified majority is 98.
SainteLagueWebster@Drop@pth, −1D, Drop@Voters, −1D, Last@pthDD
841, 32, 22, 25, 7, 3, 6, 2, 3, 9<
QualifiedMajority@NVoters, pthD
:Fraction Ø 12 264 503
18 478 506
, RealØ 0.663717, IntegerØ 100, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 37>
QualifiedMajority@Coalition, pthD
:Fraction Ø 12 264 503
18 836 146
, RealØ 0.651115, IntegerØ 98, SeatsØ 150, VoidSeatsØ 35>
ü Test on proper majority
We first restate above result on the ProperMajority and then show that QualifiedThreshold reproduces it.
ResetOptions@QualifiedThresholdD;
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 1D
8150, 88001, 590 000, 602 000<<
DutchParliament@D
81, 73, 76<
QualifiedThreshold@MethodD
:SeatsØ 81, 73, 76<, QualifiedMajorityØ :1
2
, 0.5, 75>>
Results@QualifiedThreshold, AssignmentD
:AssignmentØ
1 73 75
0 0 76
0 0 75
, QualifiedMajorityØ :1
2
,
1
2
>>
ü Test on qualified majority
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 2D
8150, 815 001, 560 000, 605 100, 15 001<<
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RVoters@D êê N
80.0125521, 0.468579, 0.506317, 0.0125521<
DutchParliament@D
81, 71, 77, 1<
Results@HighestAverage, AllD êê N
88AverageØ 87500.5, 7887.32, 7858.44, 7500.5<, MaxØ 7887.32, PositionØ H 2. L<,
8AverageØ 87500.5, 7777.78, 7858.44, 7500.5<, MaxØ 7858.44, PositionØ H 3. L<<
While DutchParliament[ ] uses highest averages, QualifiedThreshold[ ] uses Sainte-Laguë & Webster so that
the  outcomes can  be  different  already on that  account.  DutchParliament[  ]  tests  on majority but  not  on
qualified majority so that it only happens to find 77 because of the advantage for larger parties.  Instead,
QualifiedThreshold[  ]  imposes it.  The naive assignment for party C  is 75 seats. Then the test  on proper
majority gives 76 (since the default QM option setting is 1 / 2). Then the reallocation of the remainder causes
a change of the QM from 76 to 77 seats and since party C has an absolute majority in the turnout it also gets
the appropriate 77 seats that fit the QM.
QualifiedThreshold@MethodD
SainteLagueWebster::mul : Multiple solutions, first taken
:SeatsØ 82, 70, 77, 1<, QualifiedMajorityØ : 75
148
, 0.506757, 77>>
Results@QualifiedThreshold, AssignmentD
:AssignmentØ
1 70 75 1
0 0 76 0
0 0 77 0
, QualifiedMajorityØ : 1
2
,
75
148
>>
ü A note on consistent use
QualifiedThreshold[Method ] assumes that all parties are above the electoral quota. If this is not the case
then use QualifiedThreshold[Set] to remove the void parties first. The reason is that Sainte-Laguë & Webster
routine might still assign votes to such void parties, which is inconsistent with this approach.
MultipleSeatsCase@Set, 3D
8150, 88200, 590 000, 625 750, 8050, 8050<<
QualifiedThreshold@MethodD
ElectoralQuota::nl : 3 parties are below ElectoralQuota@D
QualifiedThreshold::ust : First use QualifiedThreshold@SetD
8<
QualifiedThreshold@SetD
:RemainingSeatsØ SainteLagueWebster, QualifiedMajorityØ 8267
16 210
,
ElectoralQuotaØ 8267, VoidSeatsØ
24 300
8267
, AddØ 24 300, WastedVoteØ 0, HoldØ True>
QualifiedThreshold@MethodD
:SeatsØ 873, 77<, QualifiedMajorityØ : 8267
16 210
, 0.509994, 77>>
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PartyLabels@D
8B, C<
ü Conclusion
It is conceptually attractive and technically feasible to replace the void seats by a qualified majority thresh-
old. This notion is curiously not a focal point in the discussion. 
Appendix D. District examples
ü 1. Introduction
We compare: (1) The proportional case without consideration of districts, (2) A simple district method that
applies plurality in the districts (if free  seats are present  then the highest average for the free  seats),  (3)
Proportionality with the district algorithm outlined in the body of the text (or the district case that respects
aggregate proportionality). A limited and non-systematic number of simulations with these routines suggests
that there is mostly no difference between the pure proportional case and its district version; perhaps this is
due to the way that we have programmed the random voters: when a party is popular then this tends to hold
not only for the top candidate but also for the other party candidates (so that they also tend to win in other
districts). By limiting the free seats to zero we can force a distinction beween simple districts and districts
that account for proportionality in the aggregate.
We consider three districts and allow for either 3 or 5 seats, so that the electoral quota is either 1/3 or 1/5 of
the voters. The main outcomes of three simulations are:
Subsection 2: A district effect  is possible even under proportional representation (a difference  for 2 of 3
candidates).
3 5
ProportionalAssignment A1 B1 C1 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1
SimpleDistrictAssignment A1 B2 B3 A1 A2 B2 B3 C1
DistrictAssignment A1 B2 C3 A1 A2 B2 B3 C1
Subsection 3: Under proportional districts, a minority can be included by free seats (going from 3 to 5 seats
gets B1 elected). That B1 is elected in simple districts with 3 seats may also be seen as a fluke since parties
A and C are neither elected under proportional representation, so why should B be ?
3 5
ProportionalAssignment D1 D2 D3 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
SimpleDistrictAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
DistrictAssignment D1 D2 D3 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
Subsection 4: Under proportional districts, a minority with a low score may not succeed even when free seats
are included (party C). But note that A is neither elected so that C1's election in the simple district case again
might be seen as a fluke. Party D has no majority in the electorate but the principle of highest average causes
that it gets a majority in Parliament. The simple district method however reduces D to non-majority position
- which would also happen if the method of greatest remainder is used.
3 5
ProportionalAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 B2 D1 D2 D3
SimpleDistrictAssignment B1 C1D1 B1 B2 C1D1 D2
DistrictAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 B2 D1 D2 D3
The following sections give the details.
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2. This was the example in the body of the text.
ü Definition
DistrictExample@Set, 0D
8100, 0, 0, 0, 0< 899, 0, 0, 0, 0< 890, 0, 0, 0, 0<
80, 90, 0, 0, 0< 80, 98, 0, 0, 0< 80, 30, 0, 0, 0<
80, 0, 85, 0, 0< 80, 0, 87, 0, 0< 80, 0, 60, 0, 0<
CandidatesPerDistrict@D
A1 B1 C1
A2 B2 C2
A3 B3 C3
A4 B4 C4
A5 B5 C5
This sums over the candidates and gives the voters per district per party.
Districts@Sum, TableD
A B C Sum %
District1 100 99 90 289 39.1
District2 90 98 30 218 29.5
District3 85 87 60 232 31.4
Sum 275 284 180 739 100
% 37.2 38.4 24.4 100
This sums over districts and gives the voters per candidate per party.
Districts@Sum, District, TableD
A B C
1 100 99 90
2 90 98 30
3 85 87 60
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
Sum 275 284 180
% 37.2 38.4 24.4
ü Without free seats (i.e. only one seat per district and no more)
ProportionalAssignment@3D
8SelectØ 8A1, B1, C1<<
SimpleDistrictAssignment@3D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8A1, B2, B3<, SeatsØ 81, 2, 0<<, SeatsØ 81, 2, 0<, PositionØ
1 1
2 2
3 2
,
Matrix Ø
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
, ScoreØ
ScoreH100, A1L 0 0
0 ScoreH98, B2L 0
0 ScoreH87, B3L 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
, SelectØ 8A1, B2, B3<>
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DistrictAssignment@3D
:SeatsØ 81, 1, 1<, PositionØ
1 1
2 2
3 3
, Matrix Ø
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
ScoreH100, A1L 0 0
0 ScoreH98, B2L 0
0 0 ScoreH60, C3L
0 0 0
0 0 0
, SelectØ 8A1, B2, C3<>
ü With free seats (discussed in the body of the text)
ProportionalAssignment@5D
8SelectØ 8A1, A2, B1, B2, C1<<
SimpleDistrictAssignment@5D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8A1, B2, B3<, SeatsØ 81, 2, 0<<,
SeatsØ 82, 2, 1<, PositionØ
1 1
2 2
3 2
2 1
1 3
, MatrixØ
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
ScoreH100, A1L 0 ScoreH90, C1L
ScoreH90, A2L ScoreH98, B2L 0
0 ScoreH87, B3L 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
, SelectØ 8A1, A2, B2, B3, C1<>
DistrictAssignment@5D
:SeatsØ 82, 2, 1<, PositionØ
1 1
2 2
3 2
2 1
1 3
, Matrix Ø
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
ScoreH100, A1L 0 ScoreH90, C1L
ScoreH90, A2L ScoreH98, B2L 0
0 ScoreH87, B3L 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
, SelectØ 8A1, A2, B2, B3, C1<>
ü Overview of results
The routines have stored their outcome in Results[name, NumberOfSeats] and thus we can easily provide an
overview.
3 5
ProportionalAssignment A1 B1 C1 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1
SimpleDistrictAssignment A1 B2 B3 A1 A2 B2 B3 C1
DistrictAssignment A1 B2 C3 A1 A2 B2 B3 C1
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ü 3. Districts matter when there are no free seats
ü Definition
By limiting the free seats to zero we can force a distinction beween simple districts and the district algorithm
that accounts for proportionality in the aggregate.
In  this  case  D1  might  win  in  more  districts  so  that  the  district  method  needs  rules  for  a  runner  up
(presumably of the same party).
DistrictExample@Set, 1D
86, 4, 4, 1, 0< 80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 860, 36, 17, 11, 11<
815, 5, 3, 0, 0< 81, 0, 0, 0, 0< 84, 4, 1, 0, 0< 861, 6, 0, 0, 0<
80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 821, 19, 17, 2, 0< 89, 8, 5, 1, 1< 83, 3, 1, 0, 0<
CandidatesPerDistrict@D
A1 B1 C1 D1
A2 B2 C2 D2
A3 B3 C3 D3
A4 B4 C4 D4
A5 B5 C5 D5
Districts@Sum, TableD
A B C D Sum %
District1 15 0 0 135 150 44.1
District2 23 1 9 67 100 29.4
District3 0 59 24 7 90 26.5
Sum 38 60 33 209 340 100
% 11.2 17.6 9.7 61.5 100
Districts@Sum, District, TableD
A B C D
1 21 22 13 124
2 9 19 12 45
3 7 17 6 18
4 1 2 1 11
5 0 0 1 11
Sum 38 60 33 209
% 11.2 17.6 9.7 61.5
ü Without free seats
B1 is a simple district winner without free seats, drops out under proportionality, and returns with free seats
added.
ProportionalAssignment@3D
8SelectØ 8D1, D2, D3<<
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SimpleDistrictAssignment@3D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8D1, D1, B1<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 1<<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 2<, PositionØ
1 2
1 4
2 4
,
Matrix Ø
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, ScoreØ
0 ScoreH22, B1L 0 ScoreH124, D1L
0 0 0 ScoreH45, D2L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2<>
DistrictAssignment@3D
:SeatsØ 80, 0, 0, 3<, PositionØ
1 4
2 4
3 4
, Matrix Ø
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 0 0 ScoreH124, D1L
0 0 0 ScoreH45, D2L
0 0 0 ScoreH18, D3L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8D1, D2, D3<>
ü With free seats
ProportionalAssignment@5D
8SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2, D3, D4<<
SimpleDistrictAssignment@5D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8D1, D1, B1<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 1<<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 4<, PositionØ
1 2
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 4
,
Matrix Ø
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
, ScoreØ
0 ScoreH22, B1L 0 ScoreH124, D1L
0 0 0 ScoreH45, D2L
0 0 0 ScoreH18, D3L
0 0 0 ScoreH11, D4L
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2, D3, D4<>
DistrictAssignment@5D
:SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 4<, PositionØ
1 4
1 2
2 4
3 4
4 4
, Matrix Ø
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH22, B1L 0 ScoreH124, D1L
0 0 0 ScoreH45, D2L
0 0 0 ScoreH18, D3L
0 0 0 ScoreH11, D4L
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2, D3, D4<>
2010-05-12-MultipleSeatsElections.nb   49
ü Overview of results
3 5
ProportionalAssignment D1 D2 D3 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
SimpleDistrictAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
DistrictAssignment D1 D2 D3 B1 D1 D2 D3 D4
ü 4. Simple districts can bring minorities into Parliament
The plurality method of simple districts can bring minorities into Parliament (e.g. minorities concentrated in
a local area) that would not be selected with proportionality even with a larger number of free seats. The
district algorithm for proportionality still causes that each district has a district winner but can also causes
that such small minorities drop out. This cannot always be amended by lowering the threshold since then
more candidates get elected. The issue is complicated by the choice between the methods of highest average
etcetera.  There is of course the issue of what constitutes a minority, and perhaps sticking to the electoral
quota  helps  to  reduce  the  proliferation of  minorities.  (This  is  not  just  limited to plurality.  Requiring a
majority in a district can cause that a national minority concentrated in one district gets elected while it drops
out under national proportionality.)
ü Definition
SetDistrict@3, 2, 4D
:
District1
District2
District3
,
A
B
C
D
,
A1 B1 C1 D1
A2 B2 C2 D2
A3 B3 C3 D3
A4 B4 C4 D4
A5 B5 C5 D5
>
This was created with RandomDistricts[{1000, 900, 2200}, Function Ø LogSeriesDistribution].
DistrictExample@Set, 2D
80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 847, 40, 6, 0, 0< 8386, 266, 246, 8, 1<
85, 4, 2, 1, 0< 851, 46, 23, 13, 0< 8218, 189, 17, 0, 0< 8157, 87, 42, 36, 9<
8187, 102, 57, 5, 4< 8551, 483, 120, 105, 7< 80, 0, 0, 0, 0< 8418, 161, 0, 0, 0<
Districts@Sum, TableD
A B C D Sum %
District1 0 0 93 907 1000 24.4
District2 12 133 424 331 900 22.
District3 355 1266 0 579 2200 53.7
Sum 367 1399 517 1817 4100 100
% 9. 34.1 12.6 44.3 100
Districts@Sum, District, TableD
A B C D
1 192 602 265 961
2 106 529 229 514
3 59 143 23 288
4 6 118 0 44
5 4 7 0 10
Sum 367 1399 517 1817
% 9. 34.1 12.6 44.3
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ü Without free seats
ProportionalAssignment@3D
8SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2<<
SimpleDistrictAssignment@3D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8D1, C1, B1<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 1, 1<<,
SeatsØ 80, 1, 1, 1<, PositionØ
1 2
1 3
1 4
, MatrixØ
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH602, B1L ScoreH265, C1L ScoreH961, D1L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, C1, D1<>
DistrictAssignment@3D
:SeatsØ 80, 1, 0, 2<, PositionØ
1 2
1 4
2 4
, Matrix Ø
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH602, B1L 0 ScoreH961, D1L
0 0 0 ScoreH514, D2L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, D1, D2<>
ü With free seats
C1 is a simple district winner but including even 2 free seats is not enough to get it winning under proportion-
ality.
ProportionalAssignment@5D
8SelectØ 8B1, B2, D1, D2, D3<<
SimpleDistrictAssignment@5D
:Plurality Ø 8SelectØ 8D1, C1, B1<, SeatsØ 80, 1, 1, 1<<,
SeatsØ 80, 2, 1, 2<, PositionØ
1 2
1 3
1 4
2 2
2 4
, MatrixØ
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH602, B1L ScoreH265, C1L ScoreH961, D1L
0 ScoreH529, B2L 0 ScoreH514, D2L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, B2, C1, D1, D2<>
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DistrictAssignment@5D
:SeatsØ 80, 2, 0, 3<, PositionØ
1 4
1 2
2 2
2 4
3 4
, Matrix Ø
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH602, B1L 0 ScoreH961, D1L
0 ScoreH529, B2L 0 ScoreH514, D2L
0 0 0 ScoreH288, D3L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, B2, D1, D2, D3<>
ü Overview of results
3 5
ProportionalAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 B2 D1 D2 D3
SimpleDistrictAssignment B1 C1D1 B1 B2 C1D1 D2
DistrictAssignment B1 D1 D2 B1 B2 D1 D2 D3
We see that party D with 44% of the voters still gets a majority in parliament. Its number of voters per seat
still is larger than for the not-represented parties. Parties A and C should wonder whether they should not
combine.
Results@HighestAverage, AllD êê N
88AverageØ 8367., 699.5, 517., 605.667<, MaxØ 699.5, PositionØ H 2. L<,
8AverageØ 8367., 466.333, 517., 605.667<, MaxØ 605.667, PositionØ H 4. L<<
Remaining seats can also be allocated using the method of the greatest remainder. With this method party C
also succeeds. 
DistrictAssignment@5, RemainingSeats → GreatestRemainderD
:SeatsØ 80, 2, 1, 2<, PositionØ
1 4
1 2
2 2
1 3
2 4
, Matrix Ø
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
,
ScoreØ
0 ScoreH602, B1L ScoreH265, C1L ScoreH961, D1L
0 ScoreH529, B2L 0 ScoreH514, D2L
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, SelectØ 8B1, B2, C1, D1, D2<>
Results@GreatestRemainder, AllD êê N
88RemainingVotersØ 8367., 579., 517., 177.<, MaxØ 579., PositionØ H 2. L<,
8RemainingVotersØ 8367., -241., 517., 177.<, MaxØ 517., PositionØ H 3. L<<
ü 5. Other variants
Above cases use the DutchParliament[ ] routine that does not check upon an electoral quota for a party and
that uses highest averages. Alternatively, for example, we might be interested in the quota threshold and
Sainte-Laguë  &  Webster.  The  QualifiedThreshold  method does  so  by default  (and  we can  neglect  the
implied q.m. threshold for Parliamentary decisions). The following would be alternative settings to run the
simulations above again.
Parliament@x___D := Seats ê. QualifiedThreshold@xD
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SetOptions@ProportionalAssignment, ProportionalMethod → ParliamentD
8ProportionalMethodØ Parliament<
SetOptions@DistrictAssignment,
ProportionalMethod → Parliament, RemainingSeats → SainteLagueWebsterD
8DistrictQuotaFraction Ø 0.75, RemainingSeatsØ SainteLagueWebster, ProportionalMethodØ Parliament<
Appendix E. Simpson’s paradox
Simpson’s paradox  concerns  proportions and need  not be  relevant  for  the  issue  of getting elected.  The
following example is taken from D.G. Saari (2001) and adapted to our purposes. Let there be two districts
and two parties. There are two interest groups, city people and rural people who vote in different proportions
for the parties. The districts have a different mixture of each group and the district lines cannot be drawn
otherwise. The parties thus each have candidate 1 who caters to the city people and candidate 2 who caters to
the countryside. 
SetDistrict@2, 0, 2D
8District1< 8District2<
8A< 8B<
8A1, B1< 8A2, B2<
Districts@D = :K 90 150
20 40
O, K 30 30
110 130
O>;
District 1 has for party A a share of 90 / (90 + 150 = 240) = 9 / 24 of its vote coming from the city. For party
B there is a share of 20 / (20 + 40 = 60) = 1 / 3 coming from the city. Since 9 / 24 > 1 / 3 party A is more
dependent on the city vote.
Districts@1D
K 90 20
150 40
O
District 2 has for party A a share of 30 / (30 + 30 = 60) =1 / 2 f its vote coming from the city. For party B
there is a share of 110 / (110 + 130 = 240) = 11 / 24 coming from the city. Since 1 / 2 >  11 / 24 party A is
more dependent on the city vote.
Districts@2D
K 30 110
30 130
O
For both districts A is more dependent on the city vote. Does this also hold in the aggregate ? 
Districts@Sum, TableD
A B Sum %
District1 240 60 300 50.
District2 60 240 300 50.
Sum 300 300 600 100
% 50. 50. 100
When we sum over districts then we find that the ratio for A is 120 / 300 = 12 / 30 while for B it is 130 / 300
= 13 / 30. Thus in the aggregate it is party B that is more dependent on the city vote.
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Districts@Sum, District, TableD
A B
1 120 130
2 180 170
Sum 300 300
% 50. 50.
These  proportions do not matter  in  the assignment of seats  to the  parties  and candidates  since here  the
absolute numbers are important. But the paradox can easily confuse political analysts.
Appendix F. An example of direct single seat election
ü Introduction
A small example of direct single seat election helps to clarify the difference with multiple seats election. The
notion of “direct” is relevant since an indirect or layered approach, with voters electing a Parliament and
Parliament electing the Premier, may have some intricacies. As a simplification a “party” can be defined as a
particular  preference  order  with  respect  to  candidates  for  Premier  or  President,  so  that  Parliamentary
elections only amount to establishing the weights for the various preference orders. In practice parties have
more dimensions than that.
The labels "vote", "voter" and "number" (sum versus length) abound, and they may mean something else for
single  and multiple seats  elections.  We tend  to use  "NumberOfAbc"  for  parameters  and  "NAbc[  ]"  for
functional variables, though this distinction is blurred since the order of dependency may differ per applica-
tion. The following legend may be helpful. 
MultipleSeatLegend@D
Single Seat Multiple Seats Multiple Seats Districts
Length NumberOfVoters NumberOfParties NumberOfParties NumberOfDistricts
List Votes Voters Seats@D Districts@D
Sum 1 NVoters@D NumberOfSeats NVoters@DistrictD
ü Set up
A single seat election requires variables Items, Votes and Preferences. A default example has a voting cycle.
? Condorcet
Condorcet@D sets key parameters to the example voting paradox given by Marquis de Condorcet 1785
Condorcet@D
? Items
Items = 8...< gives the list of candidates. At start-up,
Items is a function that takes NumberOfItems elements of the Alphabet
Items
8A, B, C<
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? Votes
Votes gives the list of votes per voter. The sum must add
to unity. At start-up there are 3 voters with Votes = PM@8.25, .35, Rest<D
Votes
80.25, 0.35, 0.4<
? Preferences
Preferences is a 8NumberOfVoters, NumberOfItems< matrix Hlist of listsL for the
values assigned to the items, in the order of Items. A higher value means a higher
priority. Thus 881, 2<, 81, 2<< means that there are two voters that both assign
a higher value to B rather than A. See ProperPrefsQ for ordinality, intervalêratio
scale, or cardinality. See SetPreferences for consistency of routine parameters
Preferences
1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
ü Different voting schemes
? Plurality
Plurality@p:Preferences, v:Votes, i:ItemsD gives the plurality result. The item with the
highest count is given, and it is checked whether it receives more than half of the vote
Plurality@D
:SumØ
A 0.4
B 0.35
C 0.25
, OrderingØ
0.25 C
0.35 B
0.4 A
, MaxØ 8A, 0.4<, SelectØ 8<>
? BordaAnalysis
BordaAnalysis@p:Preferences, v:Votes, i:ItemsD
gives a general analysis of the situation for a Borda type of vote:
1L the selected items
2L the BordaField
3L the positions of the maxima
4L the items sorted from lowest to highest weighted vote
BordaAnalysis@D
:SelectØ A, BordaFPQØ 8True<, WeightTotalØ 82.15, 1.95, 1.9<, PositionØ H 1 L, OrderingØ
1.9 C
1.95 B
2.15 A
>
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PairwiseMajority@D
:VoteMarginØ VoteMargin
0. -0.2 0.5
0.2 0. -0.3
-0.5 0.3 0.
,
1 Ø 8StatusQuoØ A, SumØ 81, 1, 1<, MaxØ 1, No Condorcet winnerØ 8A, B, C<,
Pref Ø Pref H8A, B, C<L, FindØ 8A, B, C<, LastCycleTestØ True, SelectØ A<,
N Ø 8SumØ 80.3, -0.1, -0.2<, Pref Ø Pref HC, B, AL, SelectØ A<, AllØ A>
ü Advised method
The method that I advise is ParetoMajority. If the Status Quo is void - an empty seat must be filled - then it is
MajorityRule.
? ParetoMajority
ParetoMajority@p_List:Preferences, v_List:Votes, i_List:Items, s_:Automatic, opts___RuleD
for preference p, votes v, items i, and status quo s, with default values Preferences,
Votes, Items and StatusQuo@D. This first determines all items that are Pareto optimising
or indifferent to s, then collapses the preferences to these points, and then applies
Borda's scheme with a fixed point, BordaFP. This itself looks for fixed point sets,
collapses again, and applies plain Borda. The N -> ... option in Options@ParetoMajorityD
controls the kind of scale used for the latter steps. Final deadlocks or ties for Borda
Fixed points are settled with the Condorcet margin count for the whole list of items
ParetoMajority@D
8StatusQuoØ A, Pareto Ø 8A<, SelectØ A<
? MajorityRule
MajorityRule@p:Preferences, v:Votes, i:ItemsD applies BordaFP@p, v, iD, and if the solution set is larger
than 1, then breaks the tie with the Concorcet margin count on the whole budget set
MajorityRule@D
BordaFP::set: Local set found: 8A, B, C<
BordaFP::chg: Borda gave 8A<, the selected Fixed Point is A
8SelectØ A<
ü Selection of the Prime Minister in the UK 2010
ü The data
Empirical application to general elections is dubious since voters have to state their  preferences  and that
information will not be available. For the UK 2010 we can try to use the data from Curtice (2009) were
voters supplied the second party of their interest. This question was asked in 2005 (in particular phrasing)
and the outcome is not accurate for 2010. We currently consider the single seat election of the Prime Minis-
ter and we should put in the names of Cameron, Brown, Clegg and X. However, the question on the second
preferences was asked on the parties and it remains useful to express that caution. Note that in practice the
Members of Parliament would provide their preference lists so that voters still could give a single vote.
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ExamplePrefs@Set, "UK2010"D;
Items
8Conservatives, Labour, LibDem, Other<
The v1 are the voting weights for the Conservatives, and so on. We can substitute the electoral outcome or
the seats in Parliament. Curtice (2009) recorded that 21% of the Conservatives voters listed Labour as their
second  choice,  54% LibDem, 15% another  candidate  and  10% no candidate.  And so on (including 2%
missing at LibDem). These data are insufficient since there can be important effects by neglecting the other
preferences. Nevertheless, let us assume that the other preferences are uniformly distributed. People are not
allowed to vote {4, 2, 2, 2} but we assume equal fractions of {4, 3, 2, 1}, {4, 3, 1, 2}, ... etcetera. 
ExamplePrefs@"UK2010", ListD
:
94, 3, 3
2
,
3
2
= 0.21 v1
94, 3
2
, 3,
3
2
= 0.54 v1
94, 3
2
,
3
2
, 3= 0.15 v1
84, 2, 2, 2< 0.1 v1
,
93, 4, 3
2
,
3
2
= 0.22 v2
9 3
2
, 4, 3,
3
2
= 0.59 v2
9 3
2
, 4,
3
2
, 3= 0.11 v2
82, 4, 2, 2< 0.08 v2
,
93, 3
2
, 4,
3
2
= 0.26 v3
9 3
2
, 3, 4,
3
2
= 0.54 v3
9 3
2
,
3
2
, 4, 3= 0.1 v3
82, 2, 4, 2< 0.1 v3
, 882, 2, 2, 4<, v4<>
ü Electoral weights
This sets Votes to the electoral result in 2010. 
Votes = Votes ê. ExamplePrefs@"UK2010", Rule, 1D
80.0758219, 0.194971, 0.0541585, 0.0361057, 0.0638356, 0.171196,
0.0319178, 0.023213, 0.0598666, 0.124338, 0.0230256, 0.0230256, 0.118525<
We find that the Conservatives have the Borda Fixed Point winner. The LibDem have the Borda winner but
in the pairwise comparisons the LibDem lose from the Conservatives. Decisive must be the 22% of Labour
that prefer the Conservatives. Of course, we lack the other preferences so this result remains a dark guess.
BordaFP@D
BordaFP::chg: Borda gave 8LibDem<, the selected Fixed Point is 8Conservatives<
Conservatives
BordaAnalysis@D
:SelectØ LibDem, BordaFPQØ 8False<, WeightTotalØ 82.67058, 2.61447, 2.71381, 2.00114<,
PositionØ H 3 L, OrderingØ
2.00114 Other
2.61447 Labour
2.67058 Conservatives
2.71381 LibDem
>
WinnerOfPair@"Conservatives", "LibDem"D
Conservatives
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Results@WinnerOfPairD
0.0758219 0
0.194971 0
0.0541585 0
0.0361057 0
0.0638356 0
0 0.171196
0.0159589 0.0159589
0.0116065 0.0116065
0 0.0598666
0 0.124338
0 0.0230256
0 0.0230256
0.0592625 0.0592625
Plus @@ Results@WinnerOfPairD
80.51172, 0.48828<
ü Parliamentary weights
For the Parliamentary weights we have to reset the voting example.
ExamplePrefs@Set, "UK2010"D;
Votes = Votes ê. Thread@
8"v1", "v2", "v3", "v4"< → PM@Append@8306, 258, 57< ê 650., RestDDD
80.0988615, 0.254215, 0.0706154, 0.0470769, 0.0873231, 0.234185,
0.0436615, 0.0317538, 0.0228, 0.0473538, 0.00876923, 0.00876923, 0.0446154<
The Conservatives win again. The weight of LibDem is reduced and Labour comes in second place. 
BordaFP@D
Conservatives
BordaAnalysis@D
:SelectØ Conservatives, BordaFPQØ 8True<, WeightTotalØ 82.88468, 2.76186, 2.51355, 1.83991<,
PositionØ H 1 L, OrderingØ
1.83991 Other
2.51355 LibDem
2.76186 Labour
2.88468 Conservatives
>
ü More ideally
The method is a bit complex for application in a general election. It can be applied easier in Parliament and
the application will reflect popular sentiment when proportional weights are used. 
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